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Full Court Press: The Imperial
Judiciary vs. The Paranoid Press

FRANCIS I. DALE*
MITCHELL W. DALE**

The authors explore the current debate between the judiciary and the
press over the fate of the first amendment. This is accomplished through a
discussion of three recent Supreme Court decisions involving diverse constitutional issues: Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (concerning newsroom
searches); Herbert v. Lando (concerning editorialprivilege); and Gannett
v. DePasquale(concerning courtroom closures). The authors analyze the
cases, examine the press reactions and come to conclusions on the validity
of both the holdings of the court and the reactions of the press. Their discussion goes beyond typical legal analysis to the broader issue of
press/judiciary interaction which is perceived as overly antagonistic,
largely unnecessary and counterproductive.
* A.B. Duke University, 1943; J.D. University of Virginia Law School, 1948,
Order of the Coif; PublisherLos Angeles Herald Examiner since 1977; Publisher of
The Cincinnati Enquirer, 1965-1973; Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva
1974-1976; Mr. Dale is the recipient of numerous honorary degrees and been both
member and officer of numerous professional, educational, religious and charitable organizations.
** A.B. Duke University, 1971; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1975;
associate with Hanson, O'Brien, Birney & Butler, Washington, D.C. specializing in
communication law.

Limits have been put on ... press freedom this past year. . . . These court decisions are a threat to the entire first
amendment ....
If we have an imperial judiciary ....
one that is bending
the first amendment at every turn, that
will be just as disruptive and devisive
as was the Imperial Presidency.
Allen Neuharth, Chairman ANPA 1
Today . . . there is a distinctly identified and dangerous threat (from the judiciary) to the free press of America.
Walter Cronkite, Anchorman,2
CBS Evening News
Indeed, one of the reasons that journalists are so worried, even perhaps
slightly paranoid, about the loss of
their freedoms is that these rights have
never been very secure, here or abroad.3
Henry Grunwald, Essayist
There appears to have developed a
paranoia among certain members of
our profession against the courts ...
J. Mart Clinton, Publisher4
San Mateo Times

I.

The strident denunciations of the Burger Court as an enemy of press freedom reflect a gross lack of proportion.
Professor Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.
5
Columbia Law School

The courts are nibbling away not only
at freedom of the press but at the
rights of the people. This is not only a
battle for the press, a battle we shall
certainly continue through all legal
means, but a struggle for the people's
right to know.
Tom Simmons, Executive Editor
6
Dallas News

Press reaction to many Supreme Court
decisions amount to overscream.there are some in the press who seem
to think that because they are rightly
given enormous freedom they must be
given absolute freedom.
7
Judge Harold Leventhal D.C. Cir.

INTRODUCTION

While conflict between the press and courts is not new, recent
decisions by the United States Supreme Court have aroused unusually acrimonious reactions from the Fourth Estate. 8 Members
1. Keynote Address by Allen Neuharth, American Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n., 93rd Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (Apr. 23, 1979) [hereinafter Keynote Address].
2. Address by Walter Cronkite to the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, Feb.
6, 1976, reprinted in Prosecutor's Brief, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 22.
3. Grunwald, The Press, the Courts and the Country, TIME, July 16, 1979, at 74.
4. Clinton, Status of the Media and the Courts, CAL. PUBLISHER, June, 1979, at
4.
5. Schmidt, Burger Court: Staunch Friend of Press Freedom, Chicago Sun
Times, July 17, 1979, at 36.
6. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, May 5, 1979, at 24.
7. The Press and the Courts. Freedom and Constraints, addressed by Judge
Leventhal to the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, (Oct. 1979) reprinted in EDrroR AND PUBLISHER, Oct. 20, 1979, at 40.
8. The term the "Fourth Estate" originally attached to the field of journalism
in Medieval Europe, although exact dates in the evolution of the terminology cannot be traced precisely. There were three generally accepted "estates", those being the nobility, the clergy, and the merchants or commoners. Estates of the
realm were considered to be parts of the body politic, each wielding distinct political powers, each considered to have a role in the determination of public policy.
The public press was originally "outside" of the estates, but gradually their role as
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of the judiciary, as well as others in the legal fraternity, are responding in kind. Charges and countercharges, of which those
quoted above are only a small part, have escalated both in frequency and vehemence. The press and the judiciary seem
headed on a collision course, firing salvos over each other's bow
all along the way. Allen Neuharth, Chairman of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association, delivered a scathing attack on
the Supreme Court at the Association's 1979 annual convention,
where he inferred that there is a deliberate campaign to curb the
press by emasculating the first amendment. In this respect, he
suggests the Court has moved "above the law."9 Standing beneath a huge banner displaying the words of the first amendment
in "old English" type, embellished with colorful calligraphy,
Neuharth sounded a clarion call to do battle to rescue and free
the first amendment. He also urged the press to go beyond (or
above) the courtrooms and get "the people-ordinary citizens-on
our side." Quoting Supreme Court Justice John Marshall,
Neuharth hurled the battle cry, "The people made the Constitution and the people can unmake it." 10
Of course, not all editors and publishers, and very few of the judiciary, agree with the Chairman's assessment of the situation.
Several publishers strongly disagree with the assertion that recent court decisions are ominous. One of them even blames the
press for the confrontation:
The impression is widespread that we are witnessing a judicial attack
upon essential privileges and immunities conferred upon the press by the
First Amendment....
The truth is precisely the reverse: We are witnessing a brand-new bid
by an agressive and highly politicized press for privileges and immunities
which it has never previously had, which it neither needs or deserves and
which it would be dangerous to confer upon it. 1 1

The chairman of the Freedom of Information Committee of
Sigma Delta Chi, the Society of Professional Journalists, calls the
screaming and dire predictions over some Court decisions "nonbeing "observers, reporters, and commentators on the rest of society" caused their
elevation to the status meriting designation as the "Fourth Estate." V ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrTANNICA, MICROPAEDIA, 116 (15th ed. 1977); I WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT.
DICTIONARY 899 (1966).
9. See note 1 supra.
10. See Keynote Address, note 1 supra.
11. Shaw, Journalists FearImpact of Court Rulings, Los Angeles Times, Jan.
1, 1979, at 28, col. 1 (quoting W. Rusher, Publisher, NATIONAL REVIEW).

sense."12 A distinguished columnist for the Wall Street Journal
describes the tendency of journalists to cry wolf at every unfavorable court ruling or government action as "a knee action reflex
that anything we find inconvenient or annoying is somehow a violation of the first amendment."13
Justice Lewis F. Powell finds no "hostility toward [the press)"
amongst his brethern on the Court.14 Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. has expressed concern "that in the heat of the controversy
[over recent decisions] the press may be misapprehending the
fundamental issues at stake

. .

." and that in some cases "the ve-

hemence of the press' reaction has been out of proportion to the
injury suffered."' 5
What's behind all this hyperbole? What are the issues giving
rise to the conflict? Is the press justified in its fears?
The press in this country has always had a relationship with
the courts, usually as an observer or watchdog, often as a litigant,
and occasionally getting caught up in the judicial process as a potential witness or a source for evidence. In whichever role the
press finds itself, it always cites the first amendment as a shield
to justify its position. When the issue is the right of the press to
publish what it wishes, that shield of protection is practically absolute, and in relation to the right of free expression, all the familiar, heady rhetoric about freedom of the press is appropriate. But
when the press tries to extend the shield first amendment of its
protection from what it publishes to how it functions, the courts
have refused to grant absolute protection. Press claims for functional protection include, for example, a constitutional right of access to newsworthy information, a constitutional right not to
divulge confidential source material, and a constitutional immunity from inquiry into the editorial process. As against such
claims, the courts balance competing constitutional claims under
the fourth and/or the sixth amendments.16
12. Aiken, Journalists Should Thrive on Struggle, The Cincinnati Enquirer,

May 13, 1979, § D, at 1.
13. Shaw, JournalistsFear Impact of Court Rulings, Los Angeles Times, Jan.
1, 1979, at 28, col. 1 (quoting Vermont Royster).
14. Statement to American Bar Association meeting (Aug. 1979), reprinted in
EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Aug. 18, 1979, at 4.

15. Press and the Court: Is the Strain Necessary?, Address by Justice Brennan
at the dedication of the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and Justice, Rutgers University, Oct. 17, 1979; see generally, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Oct. 27, 1979, at 10.
16. Justices Brennan and Stewart explain the scope of first amendment press
rights by referring to:
[T]wo distinct models of the role of the press in our society that claim
protection of the First Amendment.
Under one model-which I call the 'speech' model-the press requires and
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Over the years, minor adjustments to or expansions of the
shield that protects the functioning of the press have taken place
to accommodate the complexities of modern society, including the
advent of the broadcast media. Certain types of issues persist,
however, and repeatedly surface for judicial determination in a
variety of situations. First among these are the free press/fair
trial issues involving the conflicting or competing rights of the
press and an accused under the first and sixth amendments.17
The free press/fair trial conflict almost always arises in the context of a criminal prosecution in some celebrated murder case.18
The multifaceted issues surrounding the torts of libel and invasion of privacy and their related procedural and evidentiary questions, are a second area which repeatedly confronts the courts. In
such cases, courts must weigh the individual's right not to be
maligned and to enjoy his privacy against the right of the press to
report on public affairs.
is accorded the absolute protection of the First Amendment. In the other
model-I call it the 'structural' model-the press' interests may conflict
with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on occasion favors the competing claim.
EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Oct. 27, 1979, at 10. See also note 103 supra. Thus, for example, under the "speech" model, the press has an almost absolute right to publish information in its possession. All the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather
and disseminate the news, however, may, or may not, enjoy constitutional protections. There are many ways to "gather" and "disseminate" news and not every
method used by the press will always outweigh competing societal or personal interests (e.g., the right to a fair trial).
17. In the authors' view, constitutional rights do not so much directly conflict,
as they compete for protection from governmental encroachment. The private interests and objectives of individuals, e.g., news reporters and criminal suspects,
may conflict, one demanding the right to cover a story and the other demanding a
fair trial free of bias-producing publicity, but their constitutional rights are not in
conflict. Constitutional rights define what government can or cannot do; they do
not invoke rules of conduct between private persons. Only a government can violate a constitutional command. See Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom-Two
Rights Against the State, 13 WILLAME -IE L.J. 211 (1977).
18. See, e.g., the prosecution of Bruno Hauptmann, of Billy Sol Estes, of Dr.
Sam Sheppard, of Lee Harvey Oswald, and Jack Ruby. Perhaps no other criminal
case in the history of criminal law in America received wider publicity, pre-trial
and trial, than that of a young Massachusetts orphan named Lizzie Borden, in
1892. Charges of prejudicial press publicity were rampant. So notorious was the
case that it inspired a bit of immortal doggerel:
Lizzie Borden took an ax
And gave her father 40 whacks
And when she saw what she had done
She gave her mother 41.
Nevertheless, Lizzie Borden was acquitted.

A third group of issues frequently needing attention from the
courts addresses those problems relating to the press' claimed
right to gather news and information without interference, and to
keep its information confidential including its files and the notes
and sources of its reporters. Cases dealing with such issues involve competing claims under the first, fourth, and sixth amendments.
For the most part, cases involving each of these types of issues
are decided according to precedent and become lineal descendants of familiar and long-standing decisions in the field. Occasionally, however, a decision is handed down which departs from
the familiar legal genealogy, or at least is perceived by the press
to have so departed. When this happens, the press attacks the
courts.
Within the past five years, the pace of litigation involving these
and other press-related issues has quickened sharply and, as the
quotations appearing on the title page demonstrate, some of the
decisions have surprised and greatly troubled some numbers of
the press. The press has reason for concern, for many of the
press cases before the courts not only expose the press to damages liability, but force the courts to define, more specifically than
ever before, the exact legal boundaries of a variety of press activities. Pending cases, or those already decided by the United
States Supreme Court, deal with such matters as whether a state
can require the press to publish specified types of election-related
material;19 whether the press now has any privilege, beyond that
20
of the public generally, to access to government information;
whether police may stage unannounced raids on newspaper offices seeking evidence even though the newspaper is not suspected of any wrongdoing;21 whether states may impose prior
restraint on newspapers prohibiting the publication of the names
of juveniles charged with violent crimes; 22 whether a newspaper
19. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding a
Florida statute granting political candidates a right to reply to criticism by a newspaper violates the first amendment's guarantee of a free press). See text accompanying note 132 infra, for a discussion of the case.
20. See generally Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding neither
the first nor the fourteenth amendment provides a right of access to government
information, and that the news media has no constitutional right of access to a
county jail, over and above that of other persons, to interview inmates and make
recordings, films and photographs). Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v.
Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
21. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
22. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979). (holding a statute making it a crime for a newspaper to publish without written approval of juvenile
court, the name of a juvenile offender violated the first and fourteenth amendments).
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reporter can keep his news sources confidential without risking
jail;23 whether libel case reporters can be questioned about their
thoughts as they prepared their allegedly offending article or
broadcast; 24 whether the press can be excluded from pre-trial
hearings; 25 and whether a defendant convicted in a criminal case
automatically becomes a "public figure" and is thereby obliged to
prove actual malice before recovering in libel for press comments
26
on his conviction.
In addition, the Court let stand two important lower court decisions: 1) A case that allowed prosecutors to look at records of
newsgatherers' telephone toll calls in an effort to learn the names
of their sources 27 and 2) a case wherein a newsman was sent to
jail for refusing to turn over to the court his notes, recordings, pictures, and documents gathered during his investigation of a
crime. 28 For the first time in recent history, a Federal judge has
29
forbidden publication of an article.
State court decisions too, "are coming down like hailstones on a
tin roof."30 All across the country, trial courts, at the rate of
"eight or ten new cases every month, are demanding to see re23. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 165 (1972) (holding that requiring newsmen
to testify before a grant jury does not violate the first amendment, and that a reporter's promise to conceal the criminal conduct of his sources does not give rise
to any constitutional testimonial privilege).
24. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
25. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
26. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 99 S. Ct. 2702 (1979), (holding that
plaintiff, the nephew of admitted Russian spies, who was cited for contempt for his
failure to respond to a subpoena during a 1957-58 grand jury investigation of espionage was not a "public figure" for the purposes of a defamation suit and therefore
not required to, by the first amendment, meet the "actual malice" standard). Accord, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 St. Ct. 2675 (1979), wherein a research scientist
engaged in a federally funded research project was held not to be a "public figure"
for the purposes of a defamation suit resulting from Senator Proxmire's "Golden
Fleece Award."
27. Reporters Comm. v. American Tel. & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979).
28. The New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1001 (1978); see
also Kansas v. Sandstrom, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1333 (1978).
29. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), in
which Federal District Judge Robert Warren, distinguishing New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case), enjoined the publication of an article containing technical information concerning the construction of
the hydrogen bomb. See generally, A Most Insidious Case, THE QUILL, (June
1979).
30. Shaw, Journalists FearImpact of Court Rulings, Los Angeles Times, Jan.
1, 1979, at 28, col. 1.

porters' confidential notes and to know the identities of their con31
fidential sources."
It's getting expensive for publishers to fend off the pressure.
The New York Times was fined $285,000 on contempt charges arising from repoter Myron Farber's refusal to give the court his
notes on a story he wrote about a doctor standing trial for murder.32 The Twin Falls Times-News was ordered to pay a $1.9 million libel judgment because the newspaper refused to disclose the
identity of persons who led its reporters to public records that ul33
timately enabled them to expose an insurance fraud.
A detailed examination of the legal issues raised in three of
such cases is warranted before discussing the ramifications of the
decisions on the press and determining whether the Supreme
Court is, as alleged by the press, reducing the scope of the first
amendment. The cases are Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,34 concerning newsroom searches; Herbert v. Lando,35 concerning editorial
privilege; and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,36 concerning closed
courtrooms. These three cases were chosen for two primary reasons. First, in all three cases, the press raised legal claims of first
impression before the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme
Court previously had ruled on claims of press access, Gannett is
the first case decided by the Court wherein a claim under the first
amendment of press access to criminal pretrial proceedings is
weighed against a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial.
Secondly, these decisions have generated more press criticism
and alarm than perhaps any other cases decided by the "Burger
Court". The response has compelled various members of the
Court to defend these decisions and protest the reactions of the
news media. Accordingly, these cases can serve effectively to illustrate what many observers perceive to be a new and dangerous
period of antagonism between the press and the court.
II.

NEWSROOM SEARCHES AND THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF NON-

SUSPECT THIRD PARTIES

In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, a narrow majority of the Supreme
Court held that neither the first amendment nor the fourth
31.
32.
33.
Idaho
34.
35.
36.

Id.
New York Times v. Jascalevich, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 101 (1978).
Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1689 (D.
1978).
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
99 S. Ct. 2899 (1979).
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amendment, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment, prohibits the issuance of a warrant to search a newsroom for evidence relevant to a criminal investigation, even
though no one connected with the newspaper is suspected of
criminal conduct. The reaction of the press to this decision was
immediate and heated. Anthony Day, Chairman of the Freedom
of Information Committee on the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, called the decision "a serious threat to the freedom of the
press."37 Jack Landau, speaking for The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, called the Zurcher holding a "constitutional
outrage to the editorial privacy rights of the press to protect confidential ... information from inspection and seizure by the government."a The Los Angeles Times criticized the "narrow,
crabbed [and] suspicious view of the first amendment"3 9 taken by
the Supreme Court. The Miami Herald accused the Court of "an
appalling display of muddleheadedness"40 and the Chicago Tribune predicted this decision "will, in short, protect the Watergates
of the future."4 1 Finally, the Chicago Sun Times interpreted the
case to be "a landmark decision in press law-in the sense that a
42
bomb crater on a strip-mine scar can be a landmark."
A.

Case Background

Before assessing, as real or imagined, the threat to press freedom that the newsmedia feel has been created by this case, a review of the facts in Zurcher is instructive. On Friday, April 9,
1971, demonstrators barricaded themselves in the administrative
37. Testimony for U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommitte on the Constitution, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
38. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 2 THE NEWS & THE LAW,
July, 1978, at 4 (quoting Jack Landau).
39. EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 10, 1978, at 16.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Perhaps the most humorous, if not fanciful, editorial reaction to the
Zurcher decision came from the Clearwater (Fla.) Sun:
This week's court decision may give rise to a new breed of craftsman.
He'll be the man who can design or build hidden wall panels or secret trap
doors where evidence, no matter how innocent, can be hidden.
Another branch of knowledge that may flourish is cryptology. A reporter talking to a Mafia informer will be well advised to couch his notes
in as mysterious a script as he can conjure up. As he sits writing his expose, he may find himself looking up into the stern eyes of a deputy sheriff who has just marched through the door, waving a search warrant issued
by a friendly neighborhood magistrate.

offices of the Stanford University Hospital to protest the firing of a
black hospital employee and the denial of tenure to a Chicano
doctor. As members of the Palo Alto Police Department moved in
to evict the demonstrators, a riot ensued, resulting in extensive
damage to the administrative offices and injuries to nine police officers. The police were able to identify only a few of the demonstrators. On April 11, 1971, a special edition of the Daily, Stanford
University's student newspaper, was published devoted to the
demonstration. That edition published a photograph of the riot
which identified the photographer as a member of the Daily staff
and as having been present at the demonstration. On that basis,
it was presumed he could have photographed the assault on the
police officers. The following day, the Santa Clara County District
Attorney's Office obtained a warrant to search the Daily's offices
43
for negatives, films, and pictures of the demonstration and riot.
The affidavit in support of the application for the warrant made
no allegation that any members of the Daily staff were involved
in the unlawful acts at the hospital. The unannounced police
search of the Daily's newsroom only produced photographs which
had already been published in the April 11 special edition.
The Daily and various members of its staff subsequently filed a
civil lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California alleging deprivation under color of state law
of their constitutional rights under the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments. The issue facing the court was whether
third parties who are not suspected of criminal involvement are
entitled to the same, if not greater protection under the fourth
amendment than criminal suspects. The district court granted
the request for declaratory relief, holding that, although there was
probable cause to believe evidence relevant to the commission of
a felony would be found on the Daily's premises, the fourth and
fourteenth amendments do not tolerate warrants to search for evidence in the possession of innocent persons, without a showing of
probable cause to believe that a subpoena duces tecum is impractical.4 4 Noting that the first amendment "'modifies' the fourth
amendment to the extent that extra protections may be required
when first amendment interests are involved," 45 and that a search
43. The warrant issued on a finding of just, probable and reasonable cause
for believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material
and relevant to the identification of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit,
Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with a Deadly Weapon will be located [on the premises of the Daily).
436 U.S. at 551.
44. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 353 F. Supp. 124, 129-132 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
aJ'd per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
45. Id. at 134.
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of a newspaper is a serious infringement of press freedoms, the
trial court held that "less drastic means" must be employed when
available. Therefore, "third-party searches of a newspaper office
are impermissible in all but a very few situations... [i.e.] where
there is a clear showing that 1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a restraining order would be futile. '46 The court thus concluded that a subpoena
duces tecum was less drastic and less intrusive on an individual's
expectation of privacy than a search warrant since the individual
would present the requested documents or have the opportunity
to challenge the sufficiency of the subpoena duces tecum through
a motion to quash before production of the materials. They also
found that non-suspects were deserving of greater privacy rights.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the
opinion of the trial court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and, in a five to three decision, reversed. Justice White, author of
the majority opinion, 47 characterized the district court's holding,
that a warrant may not issue without a showing that a subpoena
is impractical, as a "sweeping revision of the fourth amendment."48 He argued that warrants are not directed at persons, but
rather authorize the search of places and seizure of things. Thus,
"[t] he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime, but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific thing to be searched for and
seized is located on the property to which entry is sought." 49 The
fourth amendment requires only probable cause to believe that
the instrumentality, fruit, or evidence of a crime is located on the
premises to be searched. "The fourth amendment has itself
struck the balance between privacy and public need... ,"50 and
courts may not "[f]orbid the states from issuing warrants ...
simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be
searched is not then reasonably suspected of criminal involve46. Id. at 135.
47. Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in Justice White's opinion, with Justice Powell also submitting a concurring opinion. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Marshall joined, and Justice Stevens filed a dissent. Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision.
48. 436 U.S. at 554.
49. Id. at 556.
50. Id. at 559.

ment."5 1
In response to the claim that such searches may interfere with
constitutionally protected newsgathering and publication, Justice
White stated that the Court was not "convinced, . . .that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress
news because of fears of warranted searches." 52 White also maintained that magistrates giving due consideration to the first
amendment values at stake and properly applying the fourth
amendment's requirements of specificity and reasonableness,
magistrates will guard against searches which "interfere with
timely publication," or involve "rummag[ing] at large in newspaper files." Furthermore, "[i]f abuse occurs, there will be time
enough to deal with it."53
B.

Zurcher's Impact on the Press

This decision by the Supreme Court raises very serious practical problems for the press. If law enforcement agencies frequently employ surprise newsroom searches as a means of
obtaining evidence in their criminal investigations, it is difficult to
believe that magistrates will not, at least on occasion, authorize
searches which interfere with timely publication, lead to the indiscriminate exposure of materials not specified in the warrant, or
compromise the confidentiality of valuable and vulnerable news
sources relationships. A critical point not adequately addressed
by the Court is that while magistrates will issue search warrants
only when proper inform, they have no control over whether the
search itself is properly conducted and limited to the materials
sought. Files and notes and even personal correspondence of reporters will necessarily be exposed to the undiscerning eyes of
the police. Among those materials may be the names of confidential sources of stories unrelated to the case under police investigation. The only remedy thus provided for such is after the fact. As
Chief Justice Burger suggested in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, there are limited controls over certain procedures and there are cases in which harassment cannot be
54
prevented.
Both the long and short term effects of such intrusions should
invoke the application of first amendment protections. One of
these protections is that even though a governmental purpose
51. Id. at 560.
52. Id. at 566.
53. Id.

54. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. at 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

Limitations on the Press
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such as law enforcement be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means which broadly infringe upon
first amendment liberties when it can be more narrowly achieved.
Wherever possible, less drastic means must be employed. 55 This
was the critical element in the District Court opinion. Obviously,
where there is no reason to believe that a newspaper would wish
to conceal or destroy evidence in its possession, service of a subpoena duces tecum would be less intrusive than surprise searches
as a means of obtaining the evidence.
A second protection which is denied newspapers subjected to
surprise searches is the opportunity to appear in court and contest the search and seizure on first amendment and other
grounds. The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions
that governmental action which threatens irreparable injury to
first amendment interests must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for an adversary hearing. A policeman's ex parte application to a magistrate for issuance of a search warrant clearly is
not an adversary hearing.
In Heller v. New York,56 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,57 and
55. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Buckley challenged provisions of

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Court held, inter alia, that the first
amendment invalidates the Act's expenditure limits since they place restrictions
on the ability to engage in political expression. In discussing the Act's restrictions
on contributions, in re the right of association, a right closely allied to freedom of
speech, the court said interference with protected rights must be closely drawn.
Id. at 25; Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). The Court set aside as unconstitutional an ex parte restraining order stopping a rally. "An order issued in
the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that
[TIhe State may not employ
will accomplish the [constitutional objective] ....
'means that broadly stifle ... liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.'" Id. at 183-84. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). "[WIhen legitimate legislative concerns are expressed which imposes a substantial burden on
protected First Amendment activities, Congress must achieve its goals by means
" Id. at 268. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
which have a 'less drastic' impact ..
(1960). Holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring teachers to report every
organization they have belonged to as violative of the right of free association.
"[E] ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means ...

"

Id. at 488 (footnotes omit-

ted).
56. 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973).
57. 378 U.S. 205 (1964) A state procedure for issuing a warrant of seizure prior
to a hearing on the issue of obscenity was held unconstitutional under the first
amendment.

Marcus v. Search Warrant,5 8 the Court held that under the first
amendment, prior to the seizure of a large quantity of books, an
adversary hearing must be held wherein testimony, affidavits, and
other evidence may be considered in order to assure that protected speech would not be needlessly suppressed in the seizure
of obscene and unprotected publications. "The history of liberty
has largely been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards." 59 If the first amendment requires an adversary hearing
prior to the intended seizure of pornographic literature, such a
procedural safeguard should certainly be required before the
seizure of newsmen's files.60
In Justice White's opinion, Zurcher is distinguished from these
cases. He posits, for example, that A Quantity of Books involved
a seizure "not merely for use as evidence but entirely removing
arguably protected materials from circulation." 61 Justice White
states that "surely a warrant to search newspaper premises for
criminal evidence such as ... news photographs taken in a public
place carries no realistic threat of prior restraint or of any direct
restraint whatsoever on . . .publication . . .or ... communica62
tion of ideas."
Justice White puts great faith in the fact that magistrates asked
to issue warrants to search newsrooms will "take cognizance of
the independent values protected by the first amendment" and
"apply the warrant requirements [of probable cause, specificity
and overall reasonableness] with particular exactitude." 63 One
58. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). A search warrant issued authorizing the police to seize
all "obscene" material. At trial, months later, much of what was seized was found
not to be obscene. The court held that the procedures used lacked safeguards to
prevent erosion of the first amendment. The abuses here show the danger to the
first amendment inherent in such searches, i.e., disruption and suppression of legitimate publications.
59. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
60. The fact that even a temporary disruption of newsroom operations or removal of documentary materials may prevent the timely publication of newsworthy information makes a prior adversary hearing all the more appropriate. In
Carroll, the Court invalidated an injunction issued ex parte against a political
rally, and observed that "the reasons for insisting upon an opportunity for hearing
and notice . . . are even more compelling than in cases involving allegedly obscene books. The present case involves a rally and 'political' speech in which the
element of timeliness may be important." 393 U.S. at 182.
61. 436 U.S. at 566. This remark is interesting in light of A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas. There, the question before the court concerned the procedure used to
seize the books, not the determination of them as obscene. The issue wasn't
whether some of the books seized were obscene, but whether the procedure used
resulted in the suppression of a permissible publication. 378 U.S. at 210. Obviously in Zurcher the real question is whether newsroom searches may result in
the suppression of permissible publication.
62. 436 U.S. at 562.
63. Id. at 565.
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must question, however, whether this is a fair trade-off for the absence of a subpoena-first policy. Such a policy surely poses less
of a threat of interference with constitutionally protected press
activities and would not impair fair and effective law enforcement,
at least where there is no reason to believe that the newspaper
either is involved in criminal activity or might remove or destroy
the evidence. Without a prior adversary hearing, a magistrate
who has no knowledge of the specific nature of the materials in a
newspaper's files or of the particular first amendment interests
threatened by a search, may authorize a search which results in
rummaging through newsrooms 64 and wholesale disclosure of
materials not relevant to the crime under investigation. In short,
there is no opportunity, prior to the intrusive search, to "[strike]
a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant [evidence] with respect to criminal
conduct." 65 Once a newsroom is invaded, a publication deadline
missed, or confidential source materials seized or exposed which
are not described in the warrant, the proper balance cannot be retrieved.
C. Zucher's Misconstruction of the Fourth Amendment
Another respect in which the Zurcher decision may be said to
64. See generally Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth
Amendment and FirstAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1976).
65. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (holding the first amendment doesn't afford a reporter a constitutional testimonial privilege with regard to confidential source material). In Branzburg, the four Justices
who joined in the majority opinion held that properly subpoenaed newsmen are
required to testify before grand juries, and do not have a right to a prior hearing
wherein the relevance or necessity for the testimony may first be tested. Nevertheless, several state and lower federal courts have followed Justice Powell's separate concurring opinion in refusing to apply the "per se Branzburg rule" in
newsmen privilege cases, particularly cases not involving grand jury testimony.
These courts put the burden on the state, or the private litigant seeking evidence
contained in a newsman's confidential source materials, to show an immediate and
compelling need for said evidence against which the relevant first amendment values may be weighed. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.
1972); Democratic Nat'l Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973);
United States v. Gersten, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1979); CBS v. Superior
Court, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1568 (Cir. Ct. Fla. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 5 Med.
L. Rptr. 1153 (Tex. 1979); Zelenka v. Wisconsin, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 266 N.W.2d 279
(1978).

be flawed is in its misconstruction of the reasonable search concept of the fourth amendment, i.e., the protection of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 66 The path to such a misconstruction was opened by
the Court's previous holding in the case of Warden, Maryland
Penitentiaryv. Hayden.67 Prior to the Warden case, and as early
as the 18th Century in England, mere evidence-and, in particular, a persons' private papers--could never be the lawful object of
a search warrant. The chief historical precedent for this rule was
the 1765 English case in which Lord Camden, while upholding a
jury verdict which had nullified a warrant seeking personal papers, attacked general warrants (i.e., "writs of assistance") used
by English authorities to search at random for incriminating evidence. 68 Beyond that, he explicitly and unequivocally denied to
magistrates the power to order the seizure of private papers:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels, they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by laws of England be guilty of a
trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written
laws that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is
none; and therefore it is too much for us without such authority to pronounce 6a9 practice legal, which would be subversive of all the comforts of
society.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Justice White largely confined his analysis to the
warrant clause, i.e., "No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. Id.
67. 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding the distinction prohibiting seizure of items of
only evidentiary value and allowing seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband is no longer accepted as being required by the fourth amendment, thus abolishing the "mere evidence" rule).
68. In Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029 (1765), a warrant was issued for the arrest of the person and seizure of the
papers of John Entick, "the author, or one concerned in writing of several weekly
very seditious papers, entitled the Monitor, or British Freeholder. . . ...Following
his arrest and the seizure of his papers, Entick sued the officer executing the warrant and the jury returned with a verdict of £300. On appeal the court acknowledged the Secretary of State's power to arrest and search, but the verdict was
upheld on the narrow ground that the messengers serving the warrant had failed
to take a constable along and did not return Entick and his papers to the judicial
Secretary who had signed the warrant. The court, however, went on to discuss the
government's authority to search without making an arrest. The court characterized this as the most interesting point in the case:
[Flor if such warrants were to be held valid, the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this Kingdom will be thrown open to search and
inspection of a messenger, whenever the Secretary of State shall think fit
to charge, or even to suspect a person to be the author, or printer, or publisher of a seditious libel.
Id.
69. Id. at 1066.
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In 1886, the Supreme Court observed that the Entick case "is
considered as one of the landmarks of English liberty." 70 The
Court has also stated that the propositions expressed in Lord
Camden's opinion "were in the minds of those who framed the
fourth amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as
sufficiently explanatory of what was mean by unreasonable
searches and seizures." 71 Although Entick, and the Supreme
Court's approval of it in Boyd v. United States, involved the issue
of compelled self-incrimination by an accused, they also were decided on the basis of individuals' legitimate expectations of privacy, and their teachings are therefore equally, if not more,
applicable to the fourth amendment protection of innocent third
parties from unreasonable searches and seizures.
In 1921, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Constitution prohibits the use of a warrant "solely for the purpose of
making a search to secure evidence to be used in a criminal or penal proceeding." 72 Rather, warrants "may be resorted to only
when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in
the interst which the public or the complainant may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or
when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of
the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be
7
taken." 3
Thus, the power to search and seize depended upon the government's valid claim of a superior possessory interest in the property; the mere need to gather evidence to use in apprehending
and convicting criminals was insufficient. This concept of fourth
amendment law subsequently came to be known as the "mere evidence" rule:
This Court has frequently recognized the distinction between merely evidentiary materials on the one hand which may not be seized either under
the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search incident
to arrest, and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be
seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is
committed, the fruits of crime, such as stolen property, weapons by which
escape of the person arrested might
be effected, and property of which the
74
possession of which is a crime.
70. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).
71. Id. at 626-27.
72. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
73. Id.
74. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947). From time to time courts
circumvented the "mere evidence" rule through rather tortured interpretations of

In Warden v. Hayden, however, the Court upheld a search and
seizure of items which clearly did not constitute contraband or
the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. The case is a classical example of the maxim that "bad cases make bad law." Hayden had
committed an armed robbery. Identified by his distinctive clothing, he was trailed from the scene of the robbery and observed
entering his residence. The police entered the residence and arrested Hayden without a warrant. This was permissible under
case law which allowed warrantless arrests based upon probable
cause and limited searches incident thereto under "exigent circumstances." 75 Once inside, however, the police not only
searched the house and seized the instrumentality (a weapon)
and the fruit of the crime (money), but also seized from a washing machine the identifying clothing that Hayden had been wearing. This clothing, which constituted "mere evidence", was
received into evidence at Hayden's prosecution. The Supreme
Court declined to overturn Hayden's conviction on the grounds
that this evidence was illegally seized and thereby refused to apply the "mere evidence" rule which had been unanimously upheld in 1921.
The Court in Warden, however, clearly was not contemplating
the authorization of the kind of surprise searches, aimed at nonsuspect third parties, of which Zurcher approves. The custodian
of the seized clothing-Hayden-was properly suspected of criminal involvement. The Court ruled that the "exigent circumstances" which justified entry and search of the house while in
"hot pursuit" without a warrant also justified the seizure of the
clothing at the time of the suspect's arrest. Since the officers
knew the suspect was armed and were looking for weapons when
they discovered the clothing, the seizure of the clothing was thus
justified.
Another element of the Court's rationale in Warden was that
the clothing was not testimonial in nature and therefore did not
compel Hayden to become a witness against himself, which is
the exception permitting the seizure and introduction into evidence of instrumentalities of crime. For instance, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals once upheld
the seizure of a defendant's shoes and their introduction into evidence to match a
heel print by arguing that the shoes were instrumentalities of crime since they
"would facilitate a robber's get-away and would not attract as much attention as a
robber fleeing barefooted from the scene of the hold-up." United States v. Guido,
251 F.2d 1, 3-4 (7th Cir. 1958).
75. See generally Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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proscribed by the fifth amendment.7 6 It is difficult to see, however, how the seizure of documentary materials in Zurcher is any
more permissible simply because the Stanford Daily was not a
suspect, and no threat of compelled self-incrimination was therefore present. This follows because the intrusiveness of a search
into private files and letters is obviously increased when directed
against third persons not suspected of criminal involvement.
By rescinding in Zurcher, the protections accorded innocent
persons under the "mere evidence" rule, which prior to Warden v.
Hayden was "acknowledged as essential to enforce the fourth
amendment's prohibition against general searches, the Court...
needlessly destroys, root and branch, a basic part of liberty's heritage." 77 It creates enormous new potential for governmental intrusions into the privacy of all citizens. As Justice Stevens
observed in his dissent to Zurcher:
Just as the witnesses who participate in an investigation or a trial far outnumber the defendants, the person or persons who possess evidence that
may help to identify an offender, or explain an aspect of a criminal transaction, far outnumber those who have custody of weapons or plunder.
Countless law abiding citizens-doctors, lawyers, merchants, customers,
bystanders-may have documents in their possession that relate to an
ongoing investigation. The consequences of subjecting this large category
78
of persons to unannounced police searches are extremely serious.

"Nonetheless, Justice White finds that, by and large, adequate
protection is found in the "'warrant clause' which speaks of
search warrants issued on 'probable cause' and 'particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.'-79 Yet, to hold that probable cause to search always
overcomes one's privacy rights regardless of the type of evidence
sought, the crime under investigation, or the individual's culpability or predisposition to conceal evidence, ignores the fact that
there is also a "reasonableness" clause in the fourth amendment.
Until Warden v. Hayden, the seizure of mere evidence, even
76. The items of clothing involved in this case are not 'testimonial' or
'commemorative' in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the fifth
amendment.... This case does not require that we consider whether
there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them
from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure.
387 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1967) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
77. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Fortas, J.; Warren, C.J., concurring).
78. 436 U.S. at 579.
79. Id. at 554.

from criminal suspects, was held to be patently unreasonable and
therefore invalid under the fourth amendment. Now, following
the Zurcher decision, the reasonableness clause of the fourth
amendment no longer forbids a search of the person or premises
of even innocent parties, so long as there is probable cause to believe they possess evidence of criminal activity. In short, the requirement of reasonableness has now been effectively ousted as
an independent element of fourth amendment protection. 80
Justice White also found the fact that "only a very few instances in the entire United States since 1791 involved the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper premises . . . hardly
suggest[ed] abuse" 8 1 and he reminded magistrates that "[wihere
the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the first
amendment, the requirements of the fourth amendment must be
applied with 'scrupulous exactitude.' "82
80. The fourth amendment guarantees that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Zurcher Court cited various cases for the proposition
that criminal culpability is not a necessary consideration in assessing the existence of probable cause. 436 U.S. at 554, 558-59. There is no precedent, however, for
the proposition that the suspected guilt or innocence of the person whose property
is to be seized is not relevant to an analysis of the reasonableness of the search.
One reason for this lack of precedent, of course, is that under the "exclusionary
rule," the only person with standing to have illegally seized evidence suppressed
is the defendant, who cannot vicariously assert the fourth amendment rights of a
innocent third party whose premises were searched. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978) and Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); but see Kaplan v.
Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 649 (1971).
The Court in Zurcher circumvented the fourth amendment's independent requirement of reasonableness by stating a) that, "in applying the 'probable cause'
standard 'by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness,' it is necessary 'to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies [the] official intrusion,'" and b) a search warrant
is reasonable in criminal investigations wherever there is "'probable cause to believe [the evidence sought] will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.'" 436 U.S.
at 554-55 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)). As
stated by one observer,
This reasoning is tautological because it merely establishes that probable
cause must be based on reasonableness and that reasonableness is dependent on probable cause. If the reasonableness clause is to retain any vitality in the context of third party searches, the requirements must be
broadened beyond the scope of probable cause.
Third Party Searches in the Face of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Toward a Set of
Reasonableness Requirements, 11 CONN. L. REv. 660 (1979).
81. 436 U.S. at 566.
82. Id. at 564. Of course, since the Supreme Court in Boyd unanimously overturned a search for mere evidence in the possession of a nonsuspect, and Warden
is therefore the only precedent for the Zurcher holding, it should surprise no one
that abuse was not prevalent prior to Zurcher. One commentator, however, re-
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It is not paranoic, however, to question the adequacy of these
protections. Without a requirement that police and prosecutors
ask or subpoena first, and search later, there is no opportunity for
an adversary hearing prior to the seizure. As a consequence, the
almost 30,000 judges, magistrates, and other federal, state, and local judicial officers authorized to issue warrants must determine
the reasonableness of a search in ex parte hearings where they
only hear the arguments of the police and prosecutor. They have
no way of hearing or determining the countervailing factors which
may cause a particular search to impact on news-gathering or dissemination. Even when the police know the evidence sought will
not be destroyed, and they could obtain the evidence by request
or subpoena, they are still under the Zurcher holding, entitled to
obtain a warrant and conduct an unannounced search.
This explicit grant of such open-ended authority to magistrates
of this county, without providing definite guidelines to aid them in
their analysis of the reasonableness of particular requests to
search, clearly presents an opportunity for abuse. 83 As Thomas
Jefferson wrote, "In questions of power, let no more be said of
confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the
chains of the constitution."
ported that fourteen searches against innocent third parties were conducted
within one month after the Zurcher decision. See Report of Hearings Before Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution on Citizens Privacy Protection Act, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1978) (testimony of Sam Dash). On October 10, 1979, police in
Oregon obtained a search warrant and seized over 1,000 pages of documents from
an attorney's file. The attorney subsequently claimed the files were confidential
under the lawyer-client privilege as the attorney's "work product" and District
Court Judge Phillip T. Abraham, Multonomah County, Oregon, ordered the return
of the documents seized. WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 18, 1979, at 6. See also O'Connor
v. Johnson, No. 49232 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1979), wherein the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that a surprise search of an attorney's files, when that attorney is not
suspected of criminal activity, is unreasonable and unconstitutional under both
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10,
of the Minnesota State Constitution.
83. Another concern relating to the absence of meaningful guidelines as to
what may determine the reasonableness of third party searches is the fact that
many officials empowered to issue warrants are not lawyers. The House Committee on Government Operations has noted that the Court's implications that "magistrates ... have at least a working knowledge of Constitutional law" are
incorrect. By one estimate of the National Center for State Courts, 8,800 of the
14,900 judges and comparable officials in states are not attorneys and "a number of
states appear not to require that warrant issuers be lawyers." HOUSE COMM. ON
GOV'T OPERATIONS, SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD DAILY
DECISION,

H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th

CONG.

2d SESs. 4 (1978).

D. The PracticalImpact of the Zurcher Decision
The threat of surprise searches impairs the operations of the
press in several respects: One, physical disruption of the newsroom may impede timely publication. Second, if others perceive
the press as an agent of law enforcement and as a source of information for prosecutors' offices, "confidential sources of information will dry up, and the press will lose opportunities to cover
various events because of fears of the participants that press files
will be readily available to the authorities."84 Finally, police may
seize materials which more than twenty-six states, by statute,
have deemed privileged from testimonial disclosure. As stated by
Justice White, "Fifth Amendment and State shield-law objections
that might be asserted in opposition to compliance with a subpoena are largely irrelevant to determining the legality of a
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment."8 5 Without a
doubt, Zurcher makes it possible for malicious judges or policemen, through newsroom searches, to plug leaks regarding their
misdoings, or to harass a newspaper that has been investigating
or criticizing them or their friends.86
84. 436 U.S. at 563-64
85. 436 U.S. at 567. Shield laws are legislative enactments of testimonial privileges which exempt newsmen, under specified circumstances, from having to testify in civil or criminal litigation as to the identity of a confidential source or with
respect to confidential information obtained from that source.
86. In testifying on so-called "Zurcher legislation" before a Congressional
Committee, Robert Lewis, representing the Society of Professional Journalists,
Sigma Delta Chi, spoke on such opportunities for abuse:
One of the Booth papers in Michigan assigned a reporter last year to follow a probate judge during business hours for two separate one-week periods. It was learned the judge spent an average of one and a half hours a
day attending to judicial duties. As part of the inquiry, off-the-record interviews were obtained from a number of lawyers, all of them critical of
the judge's work habits.
After stories on the investigation appeared, the state court administrator stepped in and the judge now is a fully contributing member of that
community's judiciary. Had the Stanford decision been available to him,
he could have seized the reporter's notes and retaliated against members
of the bar who were critical of his work habits. In this instance, innocent
persons could have been hurt.
In another Michigan city, at this moment the county prosecutor is under
investigation by a federal organized crime strike force for alleged illegal
ties to organized crime figures. The local paper has carried several stories
about the probe presumably coming from sources close to the investigation. With Stanford, the prosecutor could obtain a search warrant of the
newspaper to find, and try to plug the leaks.
In an Arkansas community, reporters obtained statements of criminal
misconduct by policemen, made to them by other police officers. The paper, not to mention cooperating policemen, would have been uneasy if the
then-police chief could have gotten a warrant to look at those notes and
memos.
REPRINT OF HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTrruTiON ON
CIzENs PRrVACY PROTECTION ACT, 95th CONG., 1st SEss. 79 (1978).
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The Court's failure to impose guidelines or otherwise limit the
scope of its holding is particularly puzzling in view of the alternatives available. Short of imposing a subpoena-first requirement in
all cases, in recognition of the unique first amendment problems
posed by newsroom searches, the Court could have at least required an adversary hearing prior to the seizure of materials in
the control of persons engaged in gathering, editing, or disseminating news for print or broadcast media. Failing that, and in recognition of the legitimate privacy interests of all persons, not just
members of the news media, the Court could have overrruled
Warden, or it could have expressly restricted the holding in Warden to its facts (i.e., a search incident to a lawful arrest) and
thereby retained the "mere evidence" rule as applied to third
party searches. Another alternative, regardless of whether the
"mere evidence" rule were retained, would have been to disapprove all third party searches except where: a) the third party
himself comes under reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement;87 or, b) the third party is shown to have a strong motive to
destroy or remove the evidence; or, c) there is probable cause to
believe that seizure of the materials sought would aid in preventing an imminent, serious crime.88
Under these alternative procedures, adequate protection would
be given to legitimate privacy interests and claims of confidentiality which might otherwise be irretrievably impaired once a warrant is executed. Thus, the legitimate law enforcement interests
served by a surprise search and seizure would not be forsaken.
For the reasons discussed above, the reaction of the presswhile undoubtedly vehement and caustic-was founded upon a
correct premise. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily is bad law in that it
permits magistrates to ignore the vital concept of reasonableness
which was enacted in the fourth amendment to safeguard every
person's individual right of privacy. All third party searches are
87. This burden could be met by a showing that the evidence is contraband, or
the fuits or instrumentalities of crime.
88. See generally Comment, Third Party Searches in the Face of Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily: Toward a Set of Reasonableness Requirements. 11 CONN. L. REV.
660 (1979). It must be recalled that probable cause does not require positive proof;
generally speaking, courts merely require reasonable grounds for an experienced
police officer to believe in the fact at issue. See generally, People v. Superior
Court of San Bernardino, 9 Cal. App. 3d 203, 209, 88 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (1970); Saunders v. Mun. Court of Vallejo Judicial Dist., 240 Cal. App. 2d 563, 565, 569, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 763, 764, 767 (1966).

now, ipsofacto, permissible so long as the minimal requirements
of the warrant clause are met. Yet, as illustrated by the words of
Justice Frankfurter, this narrow reading of the fourth amendment
disregards the cherished concepts of privacy held by the Founding Fathers:
It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the central
fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a safeguard against
recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution, or one thinks of it merely as a requirement
for a piece of paper.8 9

It has been a constant and cherished feature of our heritage
that for the law abiding citizen, his home is his castle. 90 Yet the
Supreme Court now has thrown open to official search the homes
and offices of all Americans when procedures could have been
adopted which would assure citizens of their legitimate privacy,
yet preserve the effective and necessary tools which have always
been available to law enforcement agencies.
III.
A.

EDITORIAL PRIVILEGE IN LIBEL LrrIGATION: HERBERT v. LANDO

Case Background

In Herbert v. Lando,91 a case involving public figure libel, the
Supreme Court addressed first amendment limitations on plaintiff's discovery of editorial processes in particular, the thoughts,
conclusions, and theories of the defendants in collecting, editing,
and disseminating the alleged libel, in an effort to show "actual
malice" on the defendant's part. The libel plaintiff, Anthony Herbert, received a great deal of news coverage in 1969-1970 while
serving in Viet Nam when he accused his superior officers of concealing reports of war crimes committed by United States'
soldiers. On February 4, 1973, CBS broadcast a "60 Minutes" program which, according to Herbert, portrayed him as a liar who
had made the war-crimes charges as a means of explaining his
dismissal from command. Herbert sued CBS, two of its employees (editor Barry Lando and correspondent Mike Wallace) and
the Atlantic Monthly magazine, which had published an article
written by Lando on the Herbert affair.
Herbert conceded in Federal Court that he was a "public figure"
89. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
90. The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the wind may blow through it,
the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England cannot
enter. All his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenements.
William Pitt, c. 1750.
91. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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and therefore, under first and fourteenth amendment holdings,
was precluded from recovering damages absent proof that defendants had broadcast and published the allegedly libelous statements with "actual malice", that is, with knowledge of reckless
92
disregard of their falsity.
As the Supreme Court has ruled in cases subsequent to Curtis
v. Butts,
Under this rule, absent knowing falsehood, liability requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that is, that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Such subjective awareness
to doubt the
of probable falsity may be found if there are obvious reasons
93
veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.

In August, 1974, Herbert commenced deposing defendant Lando
as to the role he played in the preparation and publication of the

alleged libelous program. During the following year, Lando answered questions about what he knew or had seen; whom he interviewed; the details of his discussions with interviewees; and
the nature and extent of his communications with news sources.
Exhibits supplied to Herbert included transcripts of interviews,
reporters' notes, film out-takes, and preliminary drafts of the "60
Minutes" telecast script. The transcript of Lando's depositions
consisted of 2903 pages and twenty-four exhibits. Lando refused,
however, to answer several questions posed by Herbert's attorneys. These questions were summarized by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals as follows:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigation regarding
people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the
"60 Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his
state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a
conclusion concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and,
as manifested by his decision to include or exclude
5. Lando's intentions
94
certain materials.
92. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to
"public figures").
93. 441 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted).
94. 568 F.2d 974, 983 (2d Cir. 1977). Specific examples of questions which
Lando refused to answer include:
-whether Lando had 'considered making a comment' in the telecast
about 'the army of Pentagon representatives going to military installations
to speak against Col. Herbert...

Upon Lando's refusal to answer these questions, Colonel Herbert sought an order in the New York Federal District Court to
compel discovery 95 under Rule 37(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 96 Herbert argued that because Lando's mental
conclusions and state of mind in the course of preparing the "60
Minutes" telecast were of critical importance in establishing
whether he knew the telecast was false or was in reckless disregard of its falsity, the questions were relevant and proper.
The defendants opposed Herbert's motion arguing that, in the
first place, the discovery already completed, including twenty six
deposition days for one witness, was more than adequate to inform Herbert of the facts and circumstances surrounding the publication in question. Further discovery, defendants argued, would
merely constitute harassment and "abuse of the liberal discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 97 which were
intended to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
civil lawsuits. Beyond that, Lando and CBS argued that the exercise of editorial judgment is constitutionally protected and extensive discovery thereof, is consequently prohibited. They also
asserted that without some assurance that their pre-publication
editorial discussions and conclusions will remain confidential, editors and journalists will refrain from candidly expressing their
self-criticisms and frank evaluations of news stories for fear such
discussions may give rise to a finding of actual malice and substantial libel damage awards; in a sense, a form of prior restraint
because of its "chilling" effect. This self-censorship and restriction on the editorial process can only impede the accurate, yet
"uninhibited, robust, and wide open" debate which the first
amendment was designed to promote. 98
The trial court refused to uphold the asserted constitutional
privilege of "editorial judgment" and ordered the discovery to proceed.99 Defendants obtained certification of this question of a
-what 'the basis' was for including in the broadcast one soldier's statement, but not another solider's statement, as to the manner in which Col.
Herbert treated the Vietnamese ...
-whether Lando had 'propose[dl to include in the program' certain
favorable comments about Herbert.
Brief of Respondents at 12, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
95. 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
96. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a)(2), "If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rules 30 or 31 [authorizing written or oral dispositions] ...
the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer..

97. Brief of Respondents at 20, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
98. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
99. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (1977).
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constitutional editorial privilege for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. Section 129 2(b) and the case went to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. There, a three-judge panel reversed the district
court.100 Two judges, writing separate opinions, concluded that
the first amendment does protect the "editorial process" which is
a necessary antecedent to the constitutionally protected dissemination of news.10 1
Concerning the so-called "chilling effect" which intrusive discovery of this editorial process was alleged to produce, and its
constitutional significance, Judge Kaufman wrote:
Herbert wishes to probe further and inquire into Lando's thoughts, opinions and conclusions. The answers he seeks strike to the heart of the vital
human component of the editorial process. Faced with the possibility of
such an inquisition, reporters and journalists would be reluctant to express their doubts. Indeed, they would be chilled in the very process of
thought. . . . [T]he tendency would be to follow the safe course of avoiding contention and controversy-the
anti-thesis of the values fostered by
102
the First Amendment.

Circuit Judge Oakes, in a concurring opinion, focused on what
he observed to be "the Supreme Court's evolving recognition of
03
the special status of the press in our governmental system,'
and the structural protections of press operations accorded by the
free press clause of the first amendment. 0 4 Noting that "[the
100. 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
101. Chief Judge Kaufman described the editorial process as follows:
The media is not a conduit which receives information and, senselessly,
spews it forth. The active exercise of human judgment must transform
the raw data of reportage into a finished product.
The journalist must constantly probe and investigate; he must formulate
his views and, at every step, question his conclusions, tentative or otherwise. This is the process in which Barry Lando was engaged and his efforts suggest the nature and scope of the reporter's task in shaping and
refining a mass of facts into a finished product.
Id. at 984.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 986 (footnote omitted).
104. Perhaps the most emminent spokesman for this interpretation of the "free
press" clause has been Justice Potter Stewart in his speech, "Or of the Press," delivered at Yale Law School in 1975. Justice Stewart pointed out:
It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that newspaper publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They are guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free
Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom
of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy ....
It is also a
mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the constitutional guarantee
of a free press is to insure that a newspaper will serve as a neutral forum
for debate, and 'marketplace for ideas,' a kind of Hyde Park corner for the

doctrine of prior restraint, prohibiting government from censoring
publications in advance, is one of the highest constitutional magnitude." 0 5 Judge Oakes pointed out that "[ulninhibited discovery into the motivations of the editor in a libel action poses
precisely the danger sought to be avoided by the landmark cases
which have established the prior restraint doctrine as hornbook
constitutional law."' 106 This danger "is that communication will be
suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in
the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the first amendment."107 The judge then observed that
the special protection sought by defendants Lando and CBSprotection from the undue chilling of first amendment freedoms
caused by the litigation process-is no different, from the standpoint of constitutional analysis, than the constitutional standard
for liability established in New York Times v. Sullivan.108
Herbert, by petition for writ of certiorari, appealed the decision
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and in a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice White, with whom
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackman, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stevens joined, acknowledged that the New York Times and
Butts decisions requiring "actual malice" as the standard of liability in public official or public figure cases provided a degree of
first amendment defense against self-censorship by the press
posed by the spectre in litigation of absolute liability and presumed damages under pre-New York Times libel law. Nevertheless:
These cases [did not] suggest any First Amendment restriction on the
sources from which the plaintiff could obtain the necessary evidence to
prove the critical elements of his cause of action. On the contrary, New
York Times and its progeny made it essential to proving liability that
plaintiffs focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant....
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that, although proof of
the necessary state of mind could be in the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact [i.e., actual malice] could be inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether
they knew or had reason to suspect that their damaging publication was
in error.1 0 9

Justice White noted that standards of liability which call into
community. A related theory sees the press as a neutral conduit of information between the people and their elected leaders. These theories, in
my view, again give insufficient weight to the institutional autonomy of
the press that it was the purpose of the Constitution to guarantee ....
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) Cf. note 16 supra.
105. 568 F.2d at 989.
106. Id. at 990.

107. Id.
108. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
109. 441 U.S. at 160.
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question the publisher's intent, and thereby involve state-of-mind
evidence, were common in libel actions before New York Times
and Butts. Prior to enactment of the first amendment, proof of
malice permitted the recovery of punitive or enhanced damages
for libel. Qualified common law privileges also existed which protected publishers from liability absent proof of malice. Thus, concluded Justice White, creation of an absolute privilege against
compelling testimony relevant to the editorial process "is not required, authorized or presaged by [the Court's] prior cases," and
would substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice,
contrary to the expectations of New York Times, Butts, and similar cases." 110
With respect to whether the court should nevertheless modify
"established constitutional doctrine" by creating such a privilege,
Justice White held that to erect such an "inpenetrable barrier"
would constitute "a substantial interference with the ability of a
defamation plaintiff to establish the necessary ingredients of malice," particularly when libel plaintiffs must "prove knowing or
reckless falsehood with 'convincing clarity.'"111
In response to the argument that the process of editorial decision-making would be intolerably chilled by requiring disclosure
of editorial conversations and conclusions, Justice White answered that "if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those
effects are precisely what New York Times and other cases have
112
held to be consistent with the first amendment."
110. Id. at 169.
111. Id. at 170 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285, 286 (1964)).
112. Id. at 171. This answer, of course, begs the question whether the current
realities of protracted, expensive, and intrusive discovery in libel litigation might
not justify modification of "established doctrine." It certainly would not be the
first time the Court substantially modified constitutional law in this area. In New
York Times v. Sullivan, the Court's creation of the "actual malice" standard was
clearly not based on pre-existing, explicit constitutional doctrine. In New York
Times, the Court addressed a rule of liability under Alabama's defamation law,
whereby statements injurious to reputation and factually untrue in any respect
entitled the public official plaintiff to general as well as punitive damages, even
though no injury be alleged or proved. The Court found the chilling effect to political speech caused by such legal presumptions, when viewed in light of the general
policies underlying the first amendment, required creation of a new privilege for
the "citizen critic of government." 376 U.S. at 282. In stating that "libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations[;] [i]t must be measured
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 269. Justice Brennan suddenly, but quite correctly, transformed libel into an area of constitutional law. In

In a similar vein, Justice White argued that
[a] s we have said, our cases necessarily contemplate examination of the
editorial process to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood,
and if indirect proof of this element does not stifle truthful publication and
is consistent with the First Amendment, as respondents seem to concede,
we do not understand how direct inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substantially more suspect. Perhaps such examination will
lead to liability that would not have been found without it, but this does
not suggest that the determinations in these instances will be inaccurate
11 3
and will lead to the suppression of protected information.

Justice White appears to be saying: a) state-of-mind evidence is
permissible under existing law" 4 and aids the judicial inquiry for
truth; b) if such evidence results in liability for damages caused
by knowing or reckless falsehood, such false speech is unprotected in any event; and, c) if state-of-mind evidence increases
the number of libel judgments for such culpable publications, this
will not chill the editorial process, for there will be "even more
reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank interchange of fact and opinion.""15
What this dispute between the press and the court may boil
dicta in several earlier cases, the Supreme Court had readily accepted the proposition that libel laws were unaffected by the first amendment. See Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 57172 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707-08 (1931). In Beauharnis v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 254-56, 262-63 (1952) the Court, noting that libel law was not subject to
first amendment limitations, upheld a criminal group libel statute which allowed a
defense of truth only "when published for good motives and for justifiable ends."
The Court in New York Times also analogized the '"privilege for criticism of official conduct ... to the protection accorded a public official when he is sued for
libel by a private citizen." 376 U.S. at 282. Yet, in approving that privilege in Barr
v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the Court acknowledged that the law of privilege as a
defense by officers of the government in suits for defamation and kindred torts
"has, in large part, been of judicial making, although the Constitution itself gives
an absolute privilege to members of both Houses of Congress in respect to any
speech ... done in session." 360 U.S. at 569. 'The privilege [as applied in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895), to executive officers of cabinet rank] is but our
expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government."
360 U.S. 572-73.
Thus, in substantially altering Constitutional law insofar as it governs liability
for defamatory speech critical of public officials, the Court in New York Times undoubtedly was influenced less by constitutional precedent than by mounting civil
rights activism directed at the suppression by local governments on basic human
liberties. Given a sufficient showing of inhibition of protected speech caused by
protracted and undue discovery of the editorial process, there is no jurisprudential
reason why the Court could not have departed from its prior decisions.
113. 441 U.S. at 172.
114. As stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974), actual
malice turns on a journalist's "subjective awareness of probable falsity."
115. 441 U.S. at 174. In his dissent, Justice Brennan challenges the validity of
this "curious observation": "Because such 'prepublication precautions' will often
prove to be extraordinarily damaging evidence in libel actions, I cannot so blithely
assume such 'precautions' will be instituted, or that such 'frank interchange' as
now exists is not impaired by its potential exposure in such actions." 441 U.S. at
195-96.
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down to is a basic fear on the part of journalists, which the court
does not share, that "editorial exchanges. . . are so subject to distortion and . . . misunderstanding,""l 6 that they will in fact give
rise to erroneous libel verdicts.
The basis for this fear is a belief that the general public often
misperceives the institutional demands on journalists and editors
which frequently makes complete investigation and verification
impossible. Editing is by no means an easy or objective task. Editors are constantly faced with press deadlines, as they struggle
daily to publish thousands and even hundreds of thousands of
words on events of the day. Much of the "hot news" which is published concerns regional, national, or international affairs. Given
the limitations on the size of a newspaper's staff, dissemination of
such news necessarily involves republication of the investigations
and observations of others' 17 which, often cannot possibly be independently verified although republication of a libel is deemed
culpable even if it is published with identifying attributions."i8
Many stories are based on information supplied by anonymous
sources. An editor, not having directly participated in the investigation, must therefore trust his reporters' judgment as to the
credibility of those sources. At the same time, an editor is aware
that, should the subject of the story sue for libel, that reporter
may not, and except in extreme cases, should not identify those
116. Id. at 174.
117. [A] vast amount of what is published in the daily and periodical press
purports to be descriptive of what somebody said rather than what anybody did. Indeed, perhaps the largest share of news concerning the doings of government appears in the form of accounts of reports, speeches,
press conferences and the like. The question of the 'truth' of such an indirect newspaper report presents rather confidential problems.
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1971).

118. See A.

HANSON,

LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS,

65-70 (1969); W.

PROSSER, LAW

TORTS, § 108 (4th ed. 1971). Various courts, however, now recognize a qualified
privilege-that so-called privilege of neutral reportage-for the accurate and disinterested reporting of newsworthy charges, "regardless of the reporter's private
views regarding their validity." Edwards v. National Audubon Soc., Inc., 556 F.2d
113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
See also Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977); Whitaker v.
Denver Post, Inc., 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1351 (D. Wyo, 1978); Harrison v. Washington Post
Co., 391 A.2d 781 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette, 59 Ill.
App. 3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (1978); Rand v. New York Times Co., 4 Med. L. Rptr.
1556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1978); Orr v. Lynch, 60 App. Div. 2d 949, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d
Dept. 1978); Campo Lindo for Dogs, Inc. v. New York Post Corp., 65 App. Div. 2d
650, 409 N.Y.S.2d 453 (3d Dept. 1978); contra Dickey v. CBS, 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir.
1978).
OF

sources in defense at trial. 119 Finally, information uncovered
through investigations into corporate, political, or other forms of
covert fraud and corruption often cannot be completely verified.
In sum, editors must rely to a large extent upon their judgment,
based on experience. For the vast majority of the time their judgment is proven to be correct. Yet, whether correct or not, the decision to publish may, on occasion, lead to libel suits claiming
millions of dollars in damages. Knowing this to be an inherent
hazard in an editor's life, the press reasonably fears inquiry into
the subjective conclusions and mental impressions arrived at in
the editorial process. The judgment to publish may be founded
on "solid belief, arrived at through experience but difficult, if not
impossible, to sustain in a specific case."'120
If Herbert is relied upon to allow virtually unlimited inquiry
into the subjective components of the editorial process, the judiciary could invite plaintiffs' attorneys and juries to second-guess a
media-defendant as to why a story was written in a certain manner. Although this aspect of the problem was not raised to any
significant degree before the Supreme Court by the attorneys for
Lando and CBS, Justice Potter Stewart's dissenting opinion pinpoints the reasons why such second-guessing may lead to erroneous libel judgments.121 In essence, Justice Stewart argues that
detailed inquiry into the way in which a story was written may ultimately incorporate common law "malice" into the constitutional
concept of "actual malice law:"
I have come greatly to regret the use in that opinion [New York Times v.
Sullivan] of the phrase "actual malice." For the fact of the matter is that
"malice" as used in the New York Times opinion simply does not mean
malice as that word is commonly understood. In common understanding,
malice means ill will or hostility, and the most relevant question in deter119. "Pledges of confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs,
and therefore should not be given lightly. Unless there is clear and pressing need
to maintain confidentiality, sources of information should be identified." AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, art.VI,

III.

120. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 563,
It may frequently be the case that journalists entertain some conscious
doubts as to the truth of their stories. Piecing together an incident under
deadline pressure from a variety of second-hand sources often calls for
rapid subjective judgments by journalists. Most likely, this is done with
varying degrees of confidence in the truth of the piece as of the time of the
publication. It would seem necessary, therefore, to incorporate the circumstances of publication in determining whether the doubts entertained
were serious enough to constitute 'reckless' journalistic behavior in a particular case. The St. Amant standard [i.e., publication with a high awareness of ... probable falsity], if literally applied, would otherwise appear
to be easier to meet than the Supreme Court intended.
Comment, Herbert v. Lando: Reporter's Privilege from Revealing the Editorial
Process in a Defamation Suit, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1978).

121. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Malice is commonly
understood to mean ill will or dislike.
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mining whether a person's action was motivated by actual malice is to ask
"why." As part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the New York
Times case, however, "actual malice" has nothing to do with hostility or ill
will, and the question "why" is totally irrelevant....
The gravamen of ... a [public official or public figure libel] lawsuit .
concerns that which was in fact published. What was not published has
nothing to do with the case. And liability ultimately depends upon the
publisher's state of knowledge of the falsity of what he published, not at
all upon his motivation in publishing it-not at all, in other
words, upon
122
actual malice as those words are ordinarily understood.

Accordingly, Justice Stewart would have ruled Colonel Herbert's
discovery questions concerning the editorial process to be irrelevant and therefore not discoverable under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
B.

Herbert's Impact on the Media

As happened after the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily decision, the
press reacted to the Herbert decision with an immediate firestorm of complaints. On April 18, 1979, Allen H. Neuharth, Chairman and President of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, stated:
The decision by the United States Supreme Court today in the Herbert
case is one more step by the current court to weaken, erode, and diminish
freedom of the press and by extension of all First Amendment freedoms.
The American people-not just the press-were the real losers today.
Last spring the Supreme Court ruled that police can rummage through
newsrooms. Today it has ruled that lawyers can rummage through reporters' and editors' minds.

Neuharth also is credited with saying that the "state of mind of
the majority of the members of the Burger Court needs examina123
tion."
Anthony Day, editorial page editor of the Los Angeles Times,
has said he fears "public officials will use this decision to try to
harass newspapers with expensive lawsuits . . . I think it will
cause trouble."'1 24 An April 29, 1979, editorial in the Des Moines
Register stated that "thinking and give-and-take are part of the
creative process. Concern that the process one day might be picked apart and may determine the outcome of litigation cannot help
but be inhibiting. If the high court believes otherwise, why did
25
the justices consult and exchange ideas in strict confidence."1
122. 441 U.S. at 199-200.
123. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Apr. 28, 1979, at 12.

124.

EDrrOR AND PUBLISHER,

May 5, 1979, at 24.

125. Editorial, Des Moines Register, April 29, 1979.

Ralph Otwell, editor of the Chicago Sun Times, said he was "appalled and flabbergasted and frustrated by the decision." He argued that the decision would pose a real problem for smaller
newspapers that do not have "lawyers on call around the clockthe decision ... could have a serious effect on the way they do
their jobs."126 Finally, Robert Phelps, managing editor of the Boston Globe, called the decision "another indication of the Supreme
Court's continuing erosion of the press's ability to report freely,
1 27
. .. an indication of the Court's view that the press is too free."'
Other representatives of the press, however, do not share the
view that Herbert makes new and dangerous inroads into press
freedom:
As a newsperson I feel that any intrusion by the Supreme Court on the
First Amendment is to be deplored. But as an American citizen I can't
throw my hands in the air and think this is going to lead to brainwashing
on the part of attorneys in libel cases. I don't know if I can agree with the
cartoonists who say the decision has sawed off our heads and scooped out
worry if
our brains. There isn't a publisher in the country who needs1 to
28
he goes to press with fairness, and accuracy and truthfulness.

Sylvan Fox, assistant managing editor of Long Island Newsday,
said "the effect of the decision is relatively minor in the sense
that I doubt very much that it will affect us and the kind of work
29
we have been doing."1
If one reflects on the prior decisions governing public official/public figure libel litigation and the manner in which the "editorial privilege" claim was raised to the Supreme Court, the
Herbert decision should neither come as a surprise nor, in itself,
pose a substantial threat to newsmen engaged in the editorial
process. As the many state and federal cases cited by Justice
White illustrate, 130 evidence falling within the asserted editorial
privilege has routinely been subject to discovery and admitted at
trial. 13 1 Moreover, in addition to the Justices who joined in Mr.
White's majority opinion, concurring Justice Powell, as well as
dissenting Justices Brennan and Marshall, did not dispute the relevance to a libel plaintiff's case of both the defendant's state of
AND PUBLISHER, May 5, 1979, at 24.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 160 n.6, 165 n.15.
131. See e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 343 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 25051, 259 N.E.2d 651, 664, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970) (evidence of ill will). Dean
Prosser equates the Sullivan standard with the "scienter" standard used in deceit
actions: "The state of the speaker's mind, notwithstanding its elusiveness as a
W. PROSmatter of psychology and its difficulty of proof, must be looked to ......
SER, LAw OF TORTS, § 107, at 700-01; § 118, at 821 (4th ed. 1971).

126. EDITOR
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mind and any admissions by one editor to another of a story's
doubtful veracity.
Furthermore, while the lack of legal authority establishing the
asserted privilege puts respondents in a difficult position, the
holdings in the principal cases cited by respondents as support
for creation of such an editorial privilege were clearly stretched
beyond their interpretive limits. In Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo,132 the Supreme Court unanimously held unconstitutional a Flordia statute creating a "right of reply" to press criticism of candidates for nomination or election. 3 3 In Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 134 the
Court held that neither the Federal Communications Act nor the
first amendment required broadcasters to accept paid political ad35
vertisements.1
These decisions reflect the strong constitutional policy in support of editorial freedom to select and "process" information for
publication. 136 But, as Justice White correctly observed, in and of
themselves, cases stating "that neither a State nor Federal Government may dictate what must or must not be printed neither
expressly nor impliedly suggest that the editorial process is im1 37
mune from any inquiry whatsoever."'
Another difficulty in the Herbert case was respondent's inabil132. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
133. The Court concluded:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forego publication of news
or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function
of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle of conduit for
news, comment, and advertising. The choice of materials to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officialswhether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment.
Id. at 258.
134. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
135. "It would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial decisions of
broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints urged by respondents. Id.
at 120.
136. "No 'government agency-local, state, or federal-can tell a newspaper in
advance what it can print and what it cannot." Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tormillo,
418 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1974).
137. 441 U.S. at 1168. Justice White further pointed out that the decisions in
Tormillo and Gertz were announced on the same day and, although the Gertz
opinion contains an overview of the role of the first amendment in libel litigation,

ity, either in written submissions to the Court or in oral argument, to adequately define the limits of the claimed privilege.
The Court, during oral argument and in Justice White's opinion,
raised serious concerns as to the scope of this privilege and found
it to be indefinite in two respects. First, it is unclear whether the
privilege would apply to non-media defendants. 38 Second, the
Court was confused as to which type of mental impressions would
fall within the privilege.
[A] Ithough we are told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as to
what he "knew" and what he had "learned" from his interviews, as opposed to what he "believed", it is not at all clear why the suggested editoknowledge as well as belief about the
rial privilege would not cover
13 9
veracity of published reports.

In oral argument, counsel for respondents asserted, under questioning from Justices Powell and Stevens, that the privilege included all thoughts and opinions regarding unpublished materials
"there was no hint that a companion case had narrowed the evidence available to
a defamation plaintiff." Id.
138. See 4 U.S. SUPREME COURT, ORAL ARGUMENTS, 42-44 (Oct. Term 1978). This
raises the recurrent controversy whether the press is an unofficial fourth branch
of the government entitled to structural protections under the first amendment in
addition to the speech protections given all persons. As discussed in note 103
supra, Justice Stewart subscribes to the theory that the free press clause of the
first amendment gives the press special structural protection, something above
and different from the protection given to individuals. See generally Stewart, Or of
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
Most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties
or specific rights of individuals: Freedom of speech, freedom of worship,
the right to counsel, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to
name a few. In contrast, the Free Press Clause extends protection to an
institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.
Justice Stewart goes on to contend that only with the advent of "investigative reporting" and "advocacy journalism" has the press assumed the role intended by
the framers of the Constitution: "The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was ... to create a fourth institution outside the government
as an additional check of the three official branches." Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). "The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection." Id. at 633.
Justice Burger, on the other hand, believes the press is not entitled to constitutional rights unavailable to all persons through the free speech clause of the first
amendment. In a concurring opinion in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978), Chief Justice Burger asserts two fundamental bases for not according special protection to the press. First, there is no evidence, or at least compelling evidence, that the framers intended to distinguish between the free speech
rights of all persons and the press freedoms of the organized media. Id. at 798-99.
Second, to involve courts legislatures, or administrative agencies in determining
which entities fall within the "institutional press" is not only "reminiscent of the
abhorred licensing system of Tudor and Stuart England-a system the first
amendment was intended to ban from this country," Id. at 801, but would invoke
an impermissibly confining approach to the free press guarantee, pegging its protection to such factors as "content of expression, frequency or fervor of expression, or ownership of the technological means of dissemination." Id.
139. 441 U.S. at 170-71.
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and all editorial communications and thought processes preceding publication. Opinions regarding specific published statements
would not be privileged.140 Nonetheless, the impression one gets
from reviewing the transcript of oral argument before the Court is
that several of the Justices were unconvinced that the privilege
could be defined in a manner capable of being administered by a
trial court.141
Finally, although respondents Lando and CBS were attempting
to obtain a broad-sweeping testimonial privilege based on first
amendment grounds, they may have been able to obtain at least
"half a loaf" had they properly raised the issue of abuse of discovery in their interlocutory appeal.' 42 The problems of undue burden and expense posed by the abuse of liberal discovery
procedures clearly concerned the entire Court. Justice Marshall
dissenting, noted that the New York Times standard of liability
cannot of itself "secure public exposure to the widest possible
... 143
range of information and insights.
Insulating the press from ultimate liability [by according some margin of
140. For example, a plaintiff could ask, "Did you believe the statement attributed to X which was broadcast?" No answer would be required, however, to the
question, "What did you think of the published statement attributed to X in light
of the contradictory statement of X (or Y) which was not broadcast?" See gener-

ally, 4 U.S.

SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS

36-38, 54-56 (Oct. Term 1978).

141. Justice White also was concerned that "[i]f damaging admissions to colleagues are to be barred from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made to
third parties not participating in the editorial process also be immune from in-

quiry?" 441 U.S. at 171. See 4 U.S.

SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS,

45-47, 59-61

(Oct. Term 1978).
142. The defendants failed to certify, for hearing on interlocutory appeal, the
question of whether further discovery might be improper under Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarThis, of course, may
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....
have been a deliberate decision, so as to force the Court to address the question of
a constitutional privilege, rather than decide the cast on the basis of more narrow,
non-constitutional grounds. Nonetheless, it might be argued that, at least in "private figure" libel cases where the plaintiff need not meet the heavy burden of
proving actual malice, the public interest in the confidentiality of the editorial
process is sufficient to authorize restrictions on discovery of particular editorial
discussions or mental conclusions. Cf., Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347 (D. Hawaii
1973); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Bredice v. Doctors
Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), adhered to, 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970),
afd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971); California v.
United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
143. 441 U.S. at 203-04.

error in publication] is unlikely to avert self-censorship so long as any
plaintiff with a deep pocket and a facially sufficient complaint is afforded
unconstrained discovery of the editorial process. If the substantive balance of interests struck in Sullivan is to remain viable, it must be reassessed in light of the procedural realities under which libel actions are
conducted.'4

Justice Marshall also asserted that through "in terrorem discovery," litigators have transformed the liberal discovery procedures
under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into "tactics
of attrition, rather than submit to the intrusiveness and expense
of protracted discovery, even editors confident of their ability to
prevail at trial or on a motion for summary may find it prudent to
'steer far wid[e] of the unlawful zone' thereby keeping protected
45
discussion from public cognizance."1
In his dissent, Justice Stewart, as mentioned above, found the
fact that Herbert had "already discovered what Lando knew, saw,
said and wrote during his investigation" to be more than sufficient; he also regarded few of the discovery questions at issue as
"com[ing] within even the most liberal construction of Rule
26(b).
... 146 The majority opinion and that of Justice Powell
also reflected the Court's concern that, particularly when discovery may impinge on press freedoms, the rules of discovery "be
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." 147 Yet the Court was not required to address the problem of undue discovery under the Federal Rules in
any determinative way, for the issue "[wihether, as a nonconstitutional matter. . . the trial judge properly applied the rules of
discovery was not within the boundaries of the question certified
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) and accordingly [was] not before
[the Court] .

'1

48

The press is clearly frustrated over the Court's refusal to uphold an absolute editorial privilege and may feel the Court's decision reflects insensitivity to the chilling effect on internal editorial
communications posed by uncontrolled discovery. It is too early
to say, however, that this decision imposes new restrictions on
the freedom to publish. On the one hand, dicta in the majority
opinion in Herbert urges that the standards of relevance be firmly
applied to avoid "undue burden or expense." Also, Justice Powell
urges district judges to superintend pretrial discovery so that it
may lead to a speedy resolution of the litigation and not unduly
impair first amendment values. The Court also surely did not ex144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
441
Id.
Id.

at 204.
at 205 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 53 (1971)).
U.S. at 202.
at 177.
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pand the areas of inquiry previously available to libel plaintiffs.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' attorneys may not have been fully
aware that questions of the sort raised by Col. Herbert constitute
permissible discovery. Moreover, in declining to create a constitutional privilege, and in not having to address, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the burdensome nature of the unanswered questions raised by Colonel Herbert, the Court's decision
does uphold, in this particular case, an absolutely staggering
amount of discovery. It is uncertain, therefore, whether the Herbert decision will have any impact upon the manner in which trial
judges exercise their responsibility to impose reasonable control
over discovery which otherwise would be limited only by the imagination of plaintiffs' attorneys.
With respect to undeserved libel verdicts, it also remains to be
seen whether the fears of the press and of Justice Stewart are
warranted. Objective criteria of knowing or reckless falsity which
may form the basis for liability, but which, by and large, protect
that necessary margin of error contemplated in New York Times v.
Sullivan, of course remain available to public figure libel plain49
tiffs. Such indicia of actual malice include outright fabrication;1
the persistent inaccuracy of a news source;150 publication on the
basis of communications with completely unverified, anonymous
sources;151 publication of a highly defamatory account of an incident, after the journalist failed to communicate with any of the
actual participants and the editor failed to discuss said account in
any detail with the journalists;152 publication of defamatory opinions with no basis in either disclosed or assumed facts;153 repeated use of provocative, defamatory headlines unsupported by
facts; 154 failure to investigate inherently improbable accusations
coupled with a strong bias or motive to defame; 55 publication,
149. See Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
150. See generally Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
151. Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1975); but see, St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d
567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 240 S.E.2d 812, 270 S.C. 65
(S.C. Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1978).
152. Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., 4 Med. L. Rptr. 1449 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1977).
153. See generally Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 1977).
154. Hodges v. Oklahoma Journal, 4 Med. L. Rptr. 2492 (Okla Ct. App. 1979).
155. Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1977).

without any independent verification, of highly defamatory statements when said statements did not constitute "hot news" and
there was ample opportunity for verification;156 repetition of a defamatory broadcast based solely on anonymous tips and without
undertaking any independent verification after having received a
denial of the charges from the public official plaintiff;157 and the
election to publish charges of corruption and peculation on the
basis of the ambiguous comments of a biased source, notwithstanding negative verification from a "neutral professional
source."158
Objective evidence in the foregoing cases of failures to verify
and investigate-when considered wholly apart from any accompanying ill will-may reasonably be construed to constitute recklessness, i.e., a needless and wanton indifference to
consequences.
Only future case law will show whether libel verdicts will increase based on subjective evidence regarding a journalist's intent. Notwithstanding the holding in Herbert, Justice White
concedes that "[ilt may be that plaintiffs will rarely be successful
in proving awareness of falsehood from the mouth of the defend159
ant himself."
Although such methods have been previously available to libel
plaintiffs, newly educated plaintiffs' attorneys may now increase
their discovery of pre-publication communications and the basis
for a defendant's choice of content. Armed with this sort of discovery, it may be reasonable to suppose that a greater number of
libel cases will reach the jury. Once there, it is anybody's guess
whether trivial or merely negligent editorial misjudgments such
as a newsman's hunch to adopt "one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document,' 160 or plausible "misinterpretations of the gist of lengthy government documents," 16 1 will,
when coupled with voluminous evidence of common law malice
156. Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 415, 142 Cal. Rptr.
304 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978).
157. Holter v. WLCY, 366 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
158. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
159. 441 U.S. at 170.
160. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971). TIME magazine quoted, from a
report of the Civil Rights Commission, charges against Pape without indicating
that the charges were those of an individual, not the findings of the commission.
Pape sued TIME for libel, claiming that its failure to reveal that it was reporting
mere allegation, showed actual malice. It was held that such failure amounted to
the adoption of one of several rational interpretations of a document, and while it
might reflect a misconception, it did not constitute actual malice.
161. Id. at 291.

[Vol. 7: 241, 1980]

Limitations on the Press
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

(ill will), be deemed to be reckless or knowing falsehood.162
Since the real impact of Herbert remains speculative, the press
might do well to cease its widely publicized hue and cry over this
decision. Herbert simply assures libel plaintiffs that they are not
barred by New York Times v. Sullivan from inquiry into subjective intent in their efforts to prove actual malice. Ingenious counsel for plaintiffs may question extensively during discovery,
consistent with Rule 26(b), but counsel for press defendants still
have available to them at trial, the same arsenal of evidentiary objections they had prior to Herbert. The rules of evidence have not
been changed and courts, if reminded by defense counsel, can
find no basis in Herbert to liberalize existing standards of proof
and admissibility. Absent an admission of actual malice by the
defendant, having an objective basis for believing the accuracy of
an offending publication, of course, remains the best defense to
162. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), highlights the very thin
line drawn by some judges between simple negligence, or negligence accompanied
by ill will and recklessness.
The trial court, appellants also argue, erroneously permitted the jury to
find actual malice from evidence of negligence and ill will. The record is
to the contrary. The court below not only charged the jury but also emphasized in the charge that neither negligence nor failure to investigate,
on the one hand, nor ill will, bias, spite, nor prejudice, on the other, standing alone, were sufficient to establish either a knowledge of the falsity of,
or a reckless disregard of, the truth or falsity of the materials used. Moreover, the court properly instructed the jurors that they should consider all
the evidence concerning appellants' acts and conduct ... in deliberating
upon whether the defendants published with actual malice. There is no
doubt that evidence of negligence, of motive and of intent may be adduced
for the purpose of establishing, by cumulation and by appropriateinferences, the fact of the defendant's recklessness or of his knowledge of falsity.
See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Id. at 342 (emphasis
added). See also Cochran v. Minneapolis Newspaper Inc., 372 N.E.2d, 1211, 1220
(Ind.App. 1978).
It is disturbing that juries, when presented with evidence of a defendant's prepublication ill will toward a plaintiff, erroneous publication by the defendant, and
the plaintiff's resulting reputational injury, may infer actual malice from negligence and ill will. New York Times requires proof of specific intent to inflict harm
through falsehood. See Greenbelt Cooperative Pub. Ass'n., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 91 (1967); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1965); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
As observed recently by the Wyoming Supreme Court, these cases "make it
clear that bad or corrupt motives, spite, hostility, ill will, or deliberate intention to
harm are not material with respect to the definition of actual malice set forth in
Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d
New York Times v. Sullivan.
556, 563 (Wyo. 1976).

rebut inferences of actual malice raised by evidence of ill will.
Even without an objective basis, a defendant will still be protected by the New York Times v. Sullivan standard which re63
quires more than a mere showing of falsity and ill will.1

By continuing its doomsday rhetoric, the press can only serve
to embolden and educate the plaintiffs' bar, and perhaps
prejudice prospective veniremen against news media which are
64
increasingly perceived to be seeking preferential treatment.1
IV.

CLOSED COURTROOMS:

GANNETT Co.

v.

DEPASQUALE

165

In this case, the Supreme Court considered for the first time
whether allegedly prejudicial pre-trial publicity can, upon the defendant's request, prompt closure of a pre-trial suppression hearing to the press and public. The facts of the case center upon the
July, 1976 disappearance of Wayne Clapp, who was last seen fishing with two companions on Lake Seneca. The two companions
later were seen driving in Clapp's pickup truck, but without
Clapp, whose bullet-ridden boat was subsequently discovered by
the police.
Two Rochester newspapers, owned by Gannett Co., Inc., published stories on Clapp's disappearance which related the investigator's theory that he had been shot in his boat and dumped
overboard. One of the stories, in the evening Times-Union, mentioned the names of Kyle Greathouse and David Ray Jones, stating that Greathouse had been identified as one of the two
companions last seen with Clapp. The story also said that Jones,
Greathouse, and Greathouse's wife were being sought by police in
connection with the disappearance.
Michigan police apprehended Jones and Mr. and Mrs.
Greathouse on July 21. On July 22, Gannett's two Rochester
newspapers reported the details of the capture, including the suspects' attempts to escape from the Michigan police. The stories
also repeated police theories that Greathouse and Jones had shot
Clapp with his own gun, robbed him, and then thrown his body
overboard.
On July 24, Gannett's morning Democrat & Chronicle reported
163. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
164. See Ledene, Scoop and Dagger,HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1979, at 91; Is the
Press Living By a Double Standard?,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 10, 1977, at
29; Does the Press Disclose All?, The Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1978, at 10, col. 3; Linde,
Advice to the Press, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, May/June, 1978, at 2; Banks, Memo to
the Press: They Hate You Out There, THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Apr. 1978, at 35; Will,
Crying Wolf., NEWSWEEK, April 30, 1970, at 104.
165. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
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that Greathouse had led police to the location where he had buried Clapp's .357 magnum, and that the suspects, along with the
gun, were being returned to New York.
The following day, it was reported that Greathouse and Jones
had been arraigned on second-degree murder charges and were
being held in Seneca County. It also was reported that three eyewitnesses had testified that they had seen Clapp's boat veering
sharply in the water following several gunshot-like noises.
On August 2, Greathouse and Jones were indicted, an occurrence reported by both the Democrat & Chronicle and the TimesUnion, along with more details of Clapp's disappearance. On August 6, similar stories were again published.
Several weeks later, attorneys for Jones and Greathouse moved
to suppress inculpatory statements made by their clients to police, asserting that the confessions had been involuntary. They
also moved to suppress certain physical evidence, including the
.357 magnum which, it was asserted, had been seized pursuant to
the involuntary confessions.
On November 4, the suppression hearing (or so-called Huntley
hearing) 166 was held before County Court Judge Daniel DePasquale. At this hearing, the defense attorneys moved to exclude
the press and public on the ground that the court would be taking
evidentiary matters into consideration that might or might not be
brought forth subsequently at trial. A Gannett reporter, present
in the courtroom at the time, offered no objection to this, nor did
the prosecutor. Justice DePasquale, noting that the defendants
had a constitutional right to an open proceeding if they so de167
sired, granted the motion for closure.
The following day, the Gannett reporter, who had been removed
from the hearing, wrote to Judge DePasquale, voicing his objec166. In People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965) the New York
Court of Appeals held that the separate inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession which is required under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), is to be conducted in a preliminary hearing.
167. Judge DePasquale stated:
[T]his Court is going to grant the motion since these matters are in the
nature of a Huntley hearing and suppression of physical evidence, and it
is not the trial of the matter. Certain evidentiary matters may come up in
the testimony of people's witnesses that may be prejudicial to the defendant, and for those reasons the Court is going to grant both motions.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 57 U.S.L.W. 4902
(1979).

tions to the closure of the Huntley hearing and requesting immediate access to the transcript. The judge responded by stating
that the hearing was concluded and that no decision had been
made regarding release of the transcript. Gannett Co. then
moved that the court set aside its order of closure. At a hearing
on that motion, Judge DePasquale acknowledged the existence of
a first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, but
held that the reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendants outweighed any competing interests of the press and the
public.
An original petition of mandamus and prohibition was subsequently filed by Gannett, alleging violation of the first, sixth, and
fourteenth amendments. On December 17, 1976, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York vacated
Judge DePasquale's order, finding that it both violated the public's interest in open judicial proceedings and constituted an unlawful prior restraint in violation of the first and fourteenth
68
amendments.1
Judge DePasquale, through the New York Attorney General's
Office, filed an appeal. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
the original exclusion order, noting that although under state law
"[ciriminal trials are presumptively open to the public, including
the press," such a presumption must give way if there exists a
threat to the defendants' right to obtain a fair trial.169
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision. Justice Stewart, in the majority opinion,170 characterized
the issue as "whether members of the public have an independent constitutional right to insist upon access to a pretrial judicial
proceeding, even though the accused, the prosecutor and the trial
judge all have agreed to the closure of that proceeding in order to
assure a fair trial."171
Justice Stewart first reviewed the "prejudicial" publicity with
which Judge DePasquale had to contend and then proceeded to
review previous cases which had characterized the public trial
guarantee under the sixth amendment as one created for the benefit of the defendant. "The Constitution nowhere mentions any
168. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 381 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976).
169. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756
(1977).
170. Joining Justice Stewart were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist also filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined, concurred in that part of Stewart's opinion relating to mootness, but
dissented from the remainder of the opinion.
171. 99 S. Ct. at 2901.
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right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public, its
guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the accused."172 Stewart specifically discussed two cases in support of
this position. In re Oliver 7 3 was a case in which the Court held
that conducting a criminal contempt hearing in secret, over the
defendant's objection, violated the accused's right to public trial
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Estes
v. Texas,174 held that a defendant was denied due process by the
75
broadcast of his trial over radio and television.
Justice Stewart acknowledged the existence of "a strong societal interest in public trials,"176 but found that "[r] ecognition of an
independent public interest in the enforcement of sixth amendment guarantees is a far cry ... from the creation of a constitutional right on the part of the public." 7 7 According to Stewart,
the historical development of the public trial guarantee which had
been detailed by Gannett and various press organizations in
briefs amici curiae, "demonstrates no more than the existence of
' 78
a common law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings.'
Stewart asserted that the Court's "judicial duty" in this case was
to determine whether the sixth amendment incorporated the
common law rule of open proceedings; whether it explicitly rejected that rule; or whether the tradition of open proceedings was
simply "left undisturbed" by the sixth amendment. While conceding that "the sixth amendment permits and even presumes
open trials as a norm," Stewart found no constitutional require172. Id. at 2905.
173. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
174. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
175. In holding that the press did not have a constitutional right to be present
with equipment to televise Billy Sol Estes' trial, the Court was concerned not so
much with whether trials are to be open the public, but rather with eliminating
the peculiar distractions of film, sound, and lighting equipment which denied to a
defendant the "judicial serenity and calm to which he is entitled." 381 U.S. at 532.
The Court stated:
[TIhe circumstances and extraneous influences intruding upon the solemn decorum of court procedure in the televised trial are far more serious
than in cases involving only newspaper coverage. Id. at 548. It is true that
the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs in its courts, but
reportersof all media including television, are always present if they wish
to be. ...
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
176. 99 S. Ct. at 2907.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2908.

ment that pre-trial proceedings "be opened to the public [when]
the participants in the litigation agree that it should be closed to
protect the defendants right to a fair trial."179 Beyond that, Stewart cited various authorities for the proposition that, whatever
common law rule or policy favored open trials, it was not as rigorously applied to pre-trial proceedings. 8 0
For the foregoing reasons, Justice Stewart found no public right
under the sixth and fourteenth amendment to attend criminal
proceedings. The Court declined to examine the question of
whether there is a public right to attend criminal trials under the
first and fourteenth amendments, stating that such an examination would be too "abstract." Justice Stewart reasoned that:
"[Elven assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, a
question we do not decide, this putative right was given all appropriate deference by the state nisi prius court in the present
case."181
Several factors lead the majority to conclude that "appropriate
deference" had been given to the putative first amendment right
to attend criminal judicial proceedings. These included the fact
that none of the spectators present in the courtroom objected at
the time of the original ruling and that counsel for Gannett had
subsequently been given an opportunity to be heard upon the motion to quash. Also persuasive in this regard were Judge DePasquale's comments that he had weighed the first amendment right
to attend the proceedings against the "reasonable probability of
prejudice to the defendants," 8 2 with the conclusion that the "putative" right to attend must give way. Finally, it was reasoned
that any denial of access was temporary and that, upon the release of the transcript of the Huntley hearing, "the press had the
opportunity to inform the public of the details of the pretrial hearing accurately and completely."' 8 3
Although joining the majority opinion of Justice Stewart, 8 4 in
179. Id. "The history upon which the petitioner and amici rely totally fails to
demonstrate that the Framers of the Sixth Amendment intended to create a constitutional right in strangers to attend a pretrial proceeding, when all that they actually did was to confer upon the accused an explicit right to demand a public
trial." Id.
180. Id. at 2909-11.
181. Id. at 2912.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Although he stated the question as relating to a "pretrial judicial proceeding," Justice Stewart concluded, "For these reasons, we hold that members of the
public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to attend criminal trials." Id. at 2911.
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his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger narrowly limited his
concurrence to the closure of pre-trial preceedings: "For me, the
essence of all this is that by definition 'pretrial proceedings' are
'
exactly that. 185
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, recognized the existence of an "interest protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in being present at pretrial suppression hearings, ' '186 but also noted that it was an interest which was to be
8 7
weighed against a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
Justice Powell said that in balancing these competing interests,
the trial court must decide "whether a fair trial for the defendant
is likely to be jeopardized by publicity, if members of the press
and public are present and free to report prejudicial evidence that
will not be presented to the jury."188 Powell also encouraged trial
judges to seek less restrictive alternative means to preserve the
fairness of the trial and to assure that the exclusion of the press
and the sealing of any transcript does not persist any longer than
necessary. Justice Powell also argued that members of the press
or public present at the time the motion for closure is made
should be given an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the
motion.189 Powell limited this right to be heard to persons pres185. Id. at 2915.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2916.
188. Id.
189. Since the Gannett decision was handed down, reporters for several newspaper groups have been issued a wallet-sized card to be read to the judge or
passed to a court officer for relay to the judge when a motion for closure is raised.
The card provided to its reporters by the Los Angeles Herald Examiner reads as
follows:
Journalists are American's guardians of the people's First Amendment
rights to afree unfettered press. Today more than ever,journalistsmust be
able to move quickly and effectively to defend the public's right to know.
The enclosed statement may be read into the court record when a reporter
is confronted with attempts to close the courtroom doors on the public and
the press. Or this card may be handed to the court clerk with a request that
it be passed immediately to the judge. In that case, sign it and date it.
Your honor, I am, a reporterfor the Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
and I would like to object on behalf of my employer and the public to this
proposed hearing. Our attorney is prepared to make a number of arguments against closings such as this one, and we respectfully ask the Court
for a hearingon those issues. Because I cannot make the appropriatelegal
arguments myself, I also request that this proceeding be suspended briefly
so that I can arrangefor counsel to come to this courtroom and make those
arguments to you. I believe our attorney can be here relatively quickly for
the Court's convenience and he will be able to demonstrate that closure in

ent in the courtroom because of the substantial and intolerable
delays which would otherwise result.19 0 Finally, Powell found
that Judge DePasquale properly balanced the competing constitutional rights involved and, "giving due deference to [his proximity] to the surrounding circumstances,"' 91 concluded that the
exclusion order was not erroneous.
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion departed from the majority opinion in yet another way because he interpreted the
Court's decision as holding that there was no sixth amendment
right of access to judicial proceedings, and "if the parties agree on
a close proceeding, the trial court is not required by the sixth
amendment to advance any reasons whatsoever for declining to
192
He further
open a pretrial hearing or trial to the public."'
stated that since the Court on numerous occasions had refused to
recognize any first amendment right of access to information generated or controlled by government, none of the procedural protections advanced by Justice Powell (right to an adverse hearing,
a finding of substantial reasons for closure) need be employed by
193
trial courts.
The press reaction to Gannett was one of outrage. The lead editorial in the July 7, 1979 Editor & Publisher magazine stated:
Once again the Supreme Court of the United States has demonstrated its
determination to establish the judiciary as a private club, meaning both an
association and a weapon.
This decision is another club in the hands of the judiciary to be used
against the press.
to
It is now within the power of the judiciary to be as much of a menace
194
to without restraint.
* . . liberty as it wants to and when it wants

Allen H. Heuharth, speaking in his capacity as both Gannett
president and president of the American Newspaper Publishers
this case will violate the First Amendment, and possibly state statutory
and constitutionalprovisions as well I cannot make the arguments myself, but our attorney can point out several issuesfor your consideration.
If it pleases the Court, we request the opportunity to be heard through
counsel. Finally,I request that this statement be made a partof the record
of this proceeding. Thank you.
Date
Reporter's signature
190. 99 S. Ct. at 2916.
191. Id. at 2917.
192. Id. at 2918 (emphasis added).
193. [The lower courts] remain, in the best tradition of our federal system,
free to determine for themselves the question whether to open or close
the proceeding. Hopefully, they will decide the question by accommodating competing interests in a judicious manner. But so far as the Constitution is concerned, the question is for them, not us, to resolve.
Id. at 2918-19. See generally Monagham, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 518 (1970). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 433 U.S. 1327, 1329
(1976).
194. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, July 7, 1979, at 9.
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Association, called the Gannett decision another chilling demonstration that the majority of the Burger court is determined to unmake the Constitution. The Supreme Court added a touch of
irony in holding this decision for release on the eve of the Fourth
of July anniversary of our independence. This new assault on the
first amendment is a sorry way to celebrate the people's guarantee of freedom. Only an aroused people can reverse this frightening court trend and prevent further erosion of the basic freedoms
of the first amendment.195
James J. Kilpatrick, a strong supporter of a strict constructionist approach to constitutional law, stated:
What [the Gannett decision] comes down to is this: In secret proceedings
as tightly controlled as England's old Star Chamber, judges and prosecutors may now connive with defendants to wheel and deal behind closed
doors. Subsequent transcripts, purporting to report pretrial proceedings,
could be unrecognizably doctored. When the press is locked out, the people lose their eyes and their ears and their sense of a fishy smell as well.
In the case at hand, the defendant's rights never196
were endangered for a
moment. The public's rights went down the tube.

Don Dwight, publisher of the MinneapolisStar and Minneapolis
Tribune, stated that Gannett "robbed" the public of its right to
watch and measure its system of justice: "The Supreme Court
has turned our criminal court system into a 'good'ol boys club'
and the public is not in the club. . . .Robbery is robbery even
when done by the United States Supreme Court." 197 One lawyerpublisher wrote the "Ode to the Gannett decision."
The Burger Court surpassed itself
and reached the heights of follies.
The Court they should have closed
was theirs instead of DePasquale's. 198
As can be seen from this small sampling of press reaction, the
Court's decision in Gannett has evoked violent criticisms and
caused considerable confusion regarding exactly what kinds of
proceedings may be closed and what kind of showing, if any, is required to justify closure. 99
195. Allen H. Neuharth, id. at 9.
196. Kilpatrick, Shadows of the Star Chamber,Washington Star, July 26, 1979.
197. EDITOR

AND PUBLISHER,

Aug. 25, 1979, at 11.

198. See EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Jan. 5, 1980, at 15 (quoting Ashton Phelps, publisher of the New Orleans Times Picayune and Stats).
199. Ifthe public or press asserts a right to attend under the sixth amendment,
the defendant apparently need make no showing of prejudice, since the Court
finds no sixth amendment right or interest in persons other than the defendant. If

Jurists also appear to be confused. A study conducted by the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, entitled Secret
Court Watch, has concluded that after July 2, 1979, when the Gannett decision was announced, motions for either closure of judicial procedings or prior restraints on publication have been made
200
in numerous cases, many of which have been approved.
Supreme Court Justices rarely comment regarding the meaning
of particular decisions of the Court, but the myriad of reaction to
Gannett has prompted four Justices to do just that. On August 9,
Chief Justice Warren Burger told a reporter for Gannett News
Service Washington that the decision "referred to pretrial proceedings only." He acknowledged that members of the judicial
community may have misinterpreted the Court's holding, stating
that "maybe judges are reading newspaper reports of what we
said" implying that the misinterpretation may have resulted from
201
inaccurate press accounts of the decision.
Less than a week after Burger's remarks, Associate Justice
Powell told a group of delegates to an American Bar Association
meeting that "we are totally dependent on the media to interpret
what we do . . .instead of having any hostility toward you [the
press], we depend upon you very much." He added, however,
that sometimes "under the constraint of deadlines, we find that
what is written appears to bear little relationship to what we did
20 2
decide."
Continuing this trend of illumination, Justice Blackmun stated
that the decision does permit barring reporters from criminal tri20 3
als.
Finally, on September 8, at the dedication of the University of
Arizona College of Law at Tucson, Justice Stevens defended the
Gannett decision for the same reasons raised in Justice Brennan's speech at Rutgers, namely that Gannett did not involve the
"core principles of First Amendment law, i.e., the right to publish,
but rather a right of press access which the Court repeatedly has
the public or press asserts a first amendment right to attend, a showing of the
"reasonable probability" of prejudice evidently justifies closure. See Prettyman,
Building Walls with Gannett, 4 DISTRICT LAWYER, Oct./Nov. 1979, at 37.
200. 93 closures have initially been enforced, upheld or appealed since the Gannett decision; 83 motions for closure have been denied or withdrawn. Of the 93
closures, 67 have been pretrial proceedings, while 23 were trial or conviction proceedings.
201. Weaver, Burger's View on Right to Attend Trial, The New York Times,
Aug. 11, 1979.
202. Greenhouse, Powell Says Court Has No Hostility Toward Press, The New
York Times, Aug. 14, 1979, at 13, col. 1.
203. Hill, Blackmun Speaks Out on Gannett Decision, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER,
Oct. 13, 1979, at 13.
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determined is not a right of Constitutional dimension." 20 4 Justice
Stevens declared:
The consistent results in cases involving the right of the press to publish,
or to decide what not to publish, are significant because they must distinguish America from other nations around the world. . . that impose significant restraints upon what the news media may publish. There is no
valid basis for questioning the present Supreme Court's faithful adherence to recognized First Amendment doctrine in the area in which its protection is of the greatest importance.
[TIhe Court's repeated refusals to extend First Amendment protection
to a right of access to newsworthy matter ... cannot fairly be described
as a withdrawal of protections previously available to the press. Quite the
contrary, they are more fairly characterized as a refusal to develop or to
recognize new rules of law.
I have heard the prophets of doom argue that the Watergate scandal
had been dewould never have been exposed if Gannett and other2 0 cases
5
cided a few years ago. That argument has not merit.

From the standpoint of first amendment law, perhaps the most
disheartening aspect of the Gannett decision for the press was
the Court's refusal to address directly the question of the existence of a first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings.
Although the Supreme Court has noted, in dicta, that "without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated," 206 the Court has again refused to recognize
a right of access to government proceedings or to information
within the government's control. 207 Whether or not one regards
the Court's failure to uphold a first amendment right of press ac204. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, Sept. 15, 1979, at 9-10.
205. Id.
206. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681.
207. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (the press has no right of access
to a county jail, over and above that of other persons, to interview inmates and
photograph or record jail conditions for broadcast or publication); Nixon v. Warner
Communications Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (the press has no constitutional right to
obtain from Judge Sirica's Federal District Court tapes of President Nixon's White
House conversations to which the public also has not been given physical access);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (a state regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews between news media representatives and inmates isupheld for it merely
restricts the press to the same degree of access accorded the public); Saxbe v.
Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (a federal prison policy prohibiting face-toface interviews between inmates and the news media upheld); United States v.
Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977) (although the press is entitled to report
whatever occurs in open court, press has no constitutional right of access to bench
conferences with counsel, exhibits identified but not received into evidence, defendant's grand jury testimony which was not read to the jury, etc.); Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977); Kearns-Tribune v. Utah Board of Corrections, 2
Med. L. Rptr. 1353 (D. Utah 1977) (the press does not have a constitutional right to
attend state executions).

cess as correct, 208 Justice Stewart's narrow treatment of the sixth

amendment issues raised, in Gannett, the nature and amount of
pre-trial publicity involved, and society's fundamental interest in
open proceedings, pose a grave danger that secret trials may become a common practice.
As Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White and Marshall point out
at the beginning of Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, it is
questionable whether any real impairment of the defendants'
right to a fair trial was actually at stake in the case. Justice
Blackmun criticized the majority for not facing up to the "placid,
routine, and innocuous nature" of the news coverage of the case
and its "comparative infrequency." 209 He pointed out that there
had been no significant media coverage of the case for almost
three months prior to the Huntley hearing, and that the publicity
"consisted almost entirely of straight forward reporting ....

The

stories contained no 'editorializing' and nothing that a fairminded person would describe as sensational journalism." Justice Blackmun found no evidence, either from the nature and extent of the publicity or from the "casual comments" made at the
hearing before Judge DePasquale, that there existed a real threat
210
of impermissible prejudicial publicity.

B. Consequences of the Gannett Decision
This factual dispute has a significant bearing on whether the
Gannett decision is sound as precedent for the closure of pre-trial
proceedings. If the threat of prejudicial publicity did in fact seriously and imminently threaten the defendants' sixth amendment
right to a fair trial, which could not otherwise be preserved, then
there arguably is authority. for Judge DePasquale's closure of the
pre-trial proceedings. 21 If, however, there was not a serious
threat to trial by an impartial jury, factual contexts similar to
208. The practical problem raised by the legal distinction between prior restraints on publication and restraint on access to the news, and the reason why
many members of the news media may regard that distinction as nothing more

than a legal fiction, is that restraint on access produces, ipso facto, restraint on
news dissemination: "It must be realized that the use of closed proceedings has
the capacity to subvert the entire effect of (decisions barring the prior restraint of
publication]." New Jersey v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377, 394 (1977).
209. 99 S. Ct. at 2919.
210. Id. at 2919-22. "The court obviously was not impressed with any brooding
presence of possible prejudicial publicity. Its comment was only that 'evidentiary
matters may come up ... that may be prejudicial.' It is difficult to imagine anything less sensational in a murder context." Id. at 2920.
211. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 685 (1972); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 358 (1966); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954); Matter of United
Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); and Gassnett Pacific v.
Richardson, 33 Med. L. Rptr. 2575 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1978).
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Gannett cannot validly be presumed to authorize closure. Also,
the Supreme Court's failure to require either a specified showing
of prejudice or a hearing on press objections to closure would
open a Pandora's box whereby any pre-trial suppression hearing
could be closed upon the prosecutor's failure to oppose the defense motion for closure. Thus, upon the acquiescence of the
prosecutor, defendants, in essence, would possess a right to com2 12
pel private suppression hearings.
Although each case involving the due process requirement of
trial before an impartial jury turns on its own facts, the Supreme
Court has announced the general rule that a fair trial does not require
that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In
these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication,
an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in
the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will
not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.
This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence
of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused,
without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a
2 13
verdict based on the evidence presented in court.
212. In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), the Court addressed the
question whether Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
conditions a defendant's waiver of a jury trial upon "the approval of the court and
the consent of the government," was invalid on the ground that the Constitution
gives a defendant a right to insist on a non-jury trial regardless of whether the
court and prosecution are willing to acquiesce. The Supreme Court found that although Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution ("[tIrial of all Crimes ... shall be
by jury.") is primarily for the protection of the accused, the accused is not thereby
given an unlimited right to compel a non-jury trial. To condition waiver of a jury
trial upon the consent of the court and prosecution therefore is not contrary to
one's right to a fair trial or to due process. Cf., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975). In Singer, the Court observed:
The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it
the right to insist upon the opposite of that right. For example, although a
defendant can, under some circumstances, waive his constitutional right
to a public trial, he has no absolute right to compel a private trial ... although he can waive his right to be tried in the State and district where
the crime was committed, he cannot in all cases compel transfer of the
case to another district ... and although he can waive his right to be confronted by the witnesses against him, it has never been seriously suggested that he can thereby compel the Government to try the case by
stipulation.
380 U.S. at 34-35 (citations omitted).
213. Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). "[TIhese cases demonstrate that pretrial publicity-even pervasive, adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial."

Admittedly, pre-trial publication as to the judicial suppression
of a defendant's confession may implant more damaging preconceived notions of an accused's guilt than would publicity as to the
facts surrounding the crime. Nonetheless, it is purely speculative
to surmise that, because evidentiary matters may come up in a
suppression hearing that may be prejudicial, publicity of such a
widespread and damaging nature will cause a result wherein an
impartial jury cannot be impaneled. Under that "standard", secret pre-trial suppression hearings will become the rule rather
than the exception.
Another difficulty with the Court's decision in Gannett is that it
fails to require a trial judge even to consider whether alternative
protective measures might be employed either at the suppression
hearing or, if incriminating evidence is suppressed, at trial.214 Of
course, measures such as expanded voir dire at trial or change of
venire, change of venue, 2 15 continuance of the trial,216 or sequestration of the jurors are available to a judge only after the suppression hearing is concluded. Only then can the real impact, if
any, of publicity concerning the pretrial proceedings be gauged.
Possible alternatives at the pretrial hearing include temporary exclusion of the press while the content of the incriminating statements is discussed, or admission of the sealed confession into
evidence and restrictions upon comment by the participants as to
its contents.
These measures have only been prescribed by the Supreme
Court as alternatives to "gag orders," 2 17 which, as prior restraints
on expression, violate what Justice Stevens has referred to as the
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). "[E xposure to information about a
state defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he
is charged [does not] alone presumptively deprive the defendant of due process."
But see, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1965), wherein the Court reversed a
murder conviction because, prior to trial, local broadcast media telecast three
times the filmed confession of the defendant made at the jail subsequent to his
arrest. The trial court, upon being advised that certain members of the jury panel
had seen the televised confession, refused the defendant's request to strike three
members from the jury panel, two of whom were deputies to the Sheriff who had
obtained the defendant's confession before television cameras.
214. Before closure, "[a]ll other measures within the power of the court to insure a fair trial must be found to be unavailing or deficient." New York Times v.
Stankey, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (1976).
215. "[Sjtate laws restricting venue must on occasion yield to the constitutional requirement that the state afford a fair trial." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 n.7 (1976) citing Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
216. "[W]here there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to
trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat
abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
217. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308 (1977) (per curiam) and Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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"core principle of the First Amendment." Nevertheless, their
availability does not become irrelevant simply because there is no
first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings.
That the Court's decision in Gannett is lax and overbroad is evident when certain considerations are taken into account. Judicial
recognition that there exists a "strong societal interest in public
trials,"218 that open judicial proceedings are one of the most con219
sistent and fundamental features of our democratic heritage,
that "[tihe operations of the courts . . . are matters of utmost
public concern," 220 that "[clontemporaneous review [of criminal
trials constitutes] an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power," 22 1 and that open judicial proceedings protect the public's "right to know" and preserve "the respect and confidence of
the community in applications of the criminal law, ' 2 2 2 illustrate
dramatically the laxity and overbreadth of the Court's decision
which requires little or no showing of the need for closure and no
223
judicial consideration of available alternatives.
Unfortunately, the opinion itself leaves so much room for spec218. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2907; see also United States v.
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Kolkii 172 F.2d 919, (3d Cir. 1949) (en banc); United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Commercial Printing Company v. Lee,
553 S.W.2d 270 (Ark. 1977); Keene Publishing Company v. Keene Dist. Court, 380
A.2d 261 (N.H. 1977); People v. Marino, 383 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Cty. Ct. 1976).
219. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-70 (1948); Radin, The Right to a Public
Trial, 6 TEMP L.Q. 381 (1932).
220. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
221. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
222. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See also Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-96 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948).
223. The American Bar Association Standards relating to the Administration of
Justice contain Standard 8-3.2 entitled "Pretrial proceedings; exclusion of public
and sealing of records." It provides, in part, that "if at the pretrial proceeding testimony or evidence is adduced that is likely to threaten the fairness of a trial, the
presiding officer shall advise those present of the danger and shall seek the voluntary cooperation of the news media in delaying dissemination of potentially prejudicial information by means of public communication until the impaneling of the
jury or until an earlier time consistent with the fair administration of justice. The
presiding officer may close a preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or any other pretrial proceeding, including a motion to supress, and may seal the record only if:
(i) the dissemination of information from the pretrial proceeding and its record
would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and
(ii) the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided
by any reasonable alternative means."

ulation that it is little wonder the press and lower court judges
are confused as to the applicability of the ruling in other factual
situations. Justice Stewart, ordinarily a gifted communicator, almost mechanically, leads the reader through, around or over the
first amendment and common law barriers to closure and then
concludes with a narrow holding based on the sixth amendment
only. He refuses to be diverted to consider any of the broader implications of the public access issue, because the trial court presumably dealt with those when it ordered the closure, although
it's not clear from the record what, if any criteria the court used
in making the order. In short, Stewart failed to provide sufficient
elaboration which might have served to help lower court judges to
understand the scope and factual context of the decision. The
opinion was so restrained that only Justice Stevens was content
to sign it without elaboration. The other three justices in the majority wrote separate opinions which were so diverse that trial
judges could and have used the decision to justify widely differing
rulings on closed-door criminal justice. While technically it was a
five to four decision, it may be more accurate to record it as a two
plus one plus one plus one to four decision.
Justice Stewart's opinion reflects an uncharacteristic coolness
toward press rights, seemingly treating the press as a "stranger"
in the courthouse. Indeed, he makes the comment that "our adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that the public interest is fully protected by the participants
in the litigation." 224 Although this view may be accurate as related to the conduct of the trial itself, it is not universally valid because it does not deal with society's right to know, through
observation (either direct or indirect) how that trial is being conducted. This freedom to observe is crucial to protecting the public interest. The Gannett opinion seems to hold otherwise,
implying that the prosecutors and the courts alone are sufficient
to protect the public interest, acting as watchdogs. This is a fine
notion, but who will watch the watchdogs? Only Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, assails the majority's stand on this subject,
asserting that "what transpires in the courtroom is public property."225
224. 99 S. Ct. at 2907.
225. Id. at 2922 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1974).

In Gannett v.

DePasquale, only Justice Powell expressly found a first amendment right of the
press and public in open judicial proceedings, and he found that right to be properly weighed by Judge DePasquale. Justice Stewart's opinion did not address the
question because it held that whatever "putative" first amendment rights exists
were given due deference by the trial court. Justice Rehnquist stated that no first

amendment rights were involved. The four dissenting Justices declined to reach
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The opinion was also somewhat deficient in that it failed to
make any distinction between pre-trial proceedings and criminal
trials. The press might well assert that the Court needs a
copyreader to catch such omissions. It has been speculated that
Justice Stewart wrote the opinion believing he was writing the
minority opinion. Supposedly, it became the majority opinion
only at the last minute when, as has been reported, Justice Powell switched sides.226 Apparently, Justice Powell was willing to
agree to the closure of the pre-trial hearing if the question
presented were defined as a sixth amendment case only. Perhaps
that explains the simplicity and narrowness of the opinion, because often a minority opinion merely makes the opposing points
and does not bother to elaborate as to all the implications that follow therefrom, as a sound majority opinion should. Thus, it may
be that the opinion will be only a temporary "detour" and that the
many unanswered questions as to when and in what circumstances a pre-trial hearing or a criminal trial may be closed will
be answered in a later case.
the issue of first amendment access for they felt that: "t] o the extent the Constitution protects a right of public access to [a judicial proceeding], the standards
enunciated under the sixth amendment suffice to protect that right." Id. at 2940.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc., the press will have the opportunity to assert arguments not raised in Gannett, but which may give greater weight to the claim of
a constitutionalright of the public to attend trials. First, it may be argued that a
right of public attendance at trials-while not explicitly found in the first and sixth
amendment-reinforces both the informational policy underlying the freedom of
the press, see, e.g., Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978);
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 430 U.S. 308 (1977);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), and the protective policies of the public trial
guarantee, see, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349, 350 (1966), In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 291 (1948). Therefore, it can be argued that the interplay of these two
amendments, and the achievement of their respective goals by public attendance
at trials, gives rise to a peripheral or penumbral right of the public to attend trials.
For examples of the Court's recognition of "penumbral" constitutional rights, see,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3
(1882); see also, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 318 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
In addition, it may be argued that while the right to attend criminal trials is not
explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, it is one "retained by the people" under
the ninth amendment. Mr. Justice Story, who was alive in 1789 when Congress enacted the sixth and ninth amendments, once wrote: "In declaring, that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial [the sixth amendment]
does but follow out the established course of the common law in all trials for
crimes. The trial is always public." III J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTriuTON OF THE UNITED STATES, 662 (3d ed. 1970).
226. Thomas, TIME, Nov. 5, 1979, at 64.

Fortunately, the Court will soon have an opportunity to limit or
modify its decision in Gannett. The Court has agreed to consider
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,227 a case involving a criminal
trial in Hanover County, Virginia. In this case, a defendant facing
murder charges requested that the public be excluded from his
trial. The prosecutor did not object. The trial judge agreed to
close the trial to the public and to the press because, he reasoned,
"having people in the courtroom is distracting to the jury." He acted pursuant to a state law which permits the exclusion of any
persons "whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair
trial."228 Although the defendant was acquitted, the publisher of
the Richmond newspaper contested the closure order.
While the outcome of any case before the Supreme Court is difficult to predict, it would appear probable that a solid majority of
the Court will vote to overrule the closure order in this case. The
dissenters in Gannett, Justices Blackmun, Brennan and White,
most likely will again recognize a sixth amendment right of the
public to attend criminal proceedings. 229 Although Justice Powell
concurred in the result of Gannett, he nonetheless found a first
amendment right to attend judicial proceedings. This right may
be abrogated only after a hearing, which Powell felt was adequate. Inasmuch as no meaningful hearing appears to have been
convened in the Richmond Newspapers case, Powell will presumably vote to overturn the closure order. Moreover, in Houchins v.
KQED Inc., Justice Stevens (another member of the majority in
Gannett) stated that "By express command of the sixth amendment the proceeding must be a 'public trial'. It is important not
only that the trial itself be fair, but also that the community at
large be confident in the integrity of the proceedings." 230 It can
227. The opinion of the circuit court and the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Virginia are not officially reported, but are set forth in the appendix to appellant's
jurisdictional statement. Docket No. 79-243 at (1), (2) & (3). 48 U.S.L.W. 3178.
228. VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975).
229. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Gannett correctly points out that
prosecutors may assent to motions for closure, not because of any real threat to
the defendant's right to a fair trial, but in order to hide police or prosecutorial misconduct or ineptitude. 99 S. Ct. at 2930. A judge and prosecutor also may connive
with defendants to close trial proceedings in order to hide their undue leniency or
favoritism toward the defendant. More commonly, judges and prosecutors may be
inclined to assent to closure so that, upon conviction of the defendant, undue publicity may not be a ground for reversible error. 99 S. Ct. at 2935-36.
230. 438 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1978). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520
F.2d 1272 (2nd Cir.) (restrictions to preserve secret identity of undercover agent),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2nd Cir.) (exclusion of public during discussion of government's anti-hijacking procedures);
Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958) (closure to better enable prosecutrix and witnesses of tender age to testify in rape prosecution); United States ex
rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2nd Cir. 1965) (exclusion of general public to
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be seen, therefore, that Justice Stevens will likely vote to overturn the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers.
Although he wrote the Court's majority opinion in Gannett
which contained frequent references to lawful closure of a
criminal trial, Justice Stewart did leave himself some leeway
within which to overturn closure orders in subsequent decisions.
A change in his stance could come about should he find that the
trial court gave no meaningful consideration to the first amendment and to the social benefits conferred by open trials, or that no
significant threat to a fair trial existed.
Chief Justice Burger, having focused his concurrence in Gannett on the fact that it involved only a pre-trial proceeding, is difficult to predict. Justice Rehnquist, who stated in Gannett that the
litigants themselves may agree to closure without convening a
hearing, or without even giving a reason for closure, will surely
vote to affirm the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court.
It is therefore very possible that, in Richmond Newspapers, the
Court will overturn the closure order by a vote of eight to one, although a seven to two vote is more likely. Judge Harold
Leventhal of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, speaking at the 1979 convention of the Associated
Press Managing Editors Association, gave odds of seven to five
that the Supreme Court, when it considers Richmond, will say
that the first amendment gives the press a constitutional interest
in these matters (i.e., criminal trials) which must be given some
weight. In our opinion, it is extremely doubtful, however, that the
Supreme Court will go so far as to find a first amendment right of
press access to a criminal trial.231
maintain decorum); People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y. 2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885
(1972) (restriction to protect undercover agent), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973);
People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588, 300 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969) (closure to
protect witnesses testifying against the murderers of Malcolm X), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 886 (1969).
231. In oral argument in Gannett, the attorney for Gannett argued that only by
open trials can abuses and unfairness to a defendant be prevented. According to
one observer.
This seemed to raise the ire of more than one justice. After intense questioning from Chief Justice Warren Burger and Associate Justices William
Rehnquist and White, the bell weather note was rung by Justice Stevens,
who put it this way: 'Does the press consider itself as a better guardian of
a defendant's rights than the trial judge? Is the press a better judge of

In addition to overturning the Virginia Supreme Court decision
on the ground that criminal trials must be open to the public, it is
generally hoped that the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers will reassess its reasoning in Gannett regarding protection
by trial participants of the public interest, 232 and will prescribe
more definite standards for trial courts to use in ruling on motions
for closure.
V.

CONCLUSION

The three recent cases discussed in this article pose different
sorts of problems for the news media as they go about their task
of informing the public. The Zurcher decision is bad law which
undermines the legitimate privacy interests of all Americans.
Should the decision lead to newsroom searches as a frequent law
enforcement practice, it also will impair-incrementally but substantially-the ability of the press to gather and disseminate valuable information from confidential news sources. The Gannett
decision is bad law as well, reflecting a kind of "all or nothing" jurisprudence. The decision to close that particular suppression
hearing clearly was not needed. If a pre-trial hearing may be
closed solely on the basis of the kind of publicity that normally
surrounds murder investigations, and on the premise that the
press may report suppression of a confession, then innumerable
criminal pre-trial proceedings will qualify for closure annually.
Moreover, although the Court finds no first amendment or sixth
amendment public right of access, the strong societal interest in
public proceedings is surely entitled to more than the minimal attention given to it. In the Court's majority opinion, the Court
presumes open judicial proceedings to be the norm, yet leaves the
press and the public with no means of enforcing that presumption
in many instances.
While the Herbert decision does not remove the protections for
journalists afforded by New York Times v. Sullivan, it may, nevertheless, subject the press to more expansive and subjective pretrial discovery in plaintiff's efforts to support allegations of actual
malice. To avoid an increase in undeserved libel verdicts is
founded on evidence of falsity coupled with common law malice,
libel defense attorneys must be even more assiduous in assuring
that trial courts' jury instructions emphasize both the policy unfairness than a jurist?'.. . His questions all but cried out with the judicial
complaint that the press is overstepping its bounds.
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 2, 1978, at 7; 4 U.S. SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS 23,
Oct. Term 1978.
232. 99 S. Ct. at 2908.

[Vol. 7: 241, 1980]

Limitations on the Press
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

derlying the strict actual malice standards and the restrictions on
its evidentiary components.
A vocal and growing segment of the news media is convinced
that these three cases illustrate how the current Supreme Court
has sought to narrow the constitutional protection of the press.
The authors do not stand with this segment of the news media. In
Zurcher and Herbert, the Supreme Court, rightly or wrongly, declined to forge new protections for the press which would exempt
news media from legal obligations applicable to all citizens. In
Gannett, the Court rejected, under the particular circumstances
presented, a tradition of open justice which predates colonial
times. The Court, however, did not narrow or overrule its previous interpretations of first amendment law relating to press access.
A more important question raised by these decisions is whether
the news media have presented these cases in such a way as to
limit the Court's flexibility to rule in its favor. The press also
must ask itself whether its vehement and even caustic reaction to
recent decisions will only serve to reduce its credibility in its future claims for judicial relief.
In at least two of the cases discussed herein, it can be argued
that the press failed to raise the proper issues before the
Supreme Court, but rather continued to beat the drum for broad
constitutional protection of the right to gather news, as opposed
to publishing it. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,23 3 the press did not
force the Court to address the very shaky precedent of Warden v.
Hayden.23 4 Nor did the press emphasize to the Court the protections contained in the "reasonableness clause" of the fourth
amendment. Instead, the press focused only upon the first
amendment. The Court was asked to invalidate surprise searches
because a) they might impair confidential newsgathering-a function which the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes23 5 had already decided was not deserving of constitutional protection, and b) they
may, in future cases, be conducted so disruptively as to delay protected publication.
In Herbert, too, the press may have chosen to fight its battle
with the wrong weapons. Indeed, the defendants neglected to
233. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
234. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
235. 408 U.S. 165 (1972).

preserve for the Court's consideration the question of whether
the voluminous depositions and production of documents already
completed should bar further discovery as unduly burdensome.
Instead, the press asked the Court to create an absolute editorial
privilege, the bounds of which were not clear to anyone involved
in the case.
Although such criticism is easy when one has the benefit of
hindsight, it can be observed that even in Gannett, the media's arguments were less than adequate. The dissenters in Gannett
found a public right to attend judicial proceedings grounded in
the sixth amendment, and Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion,
found a first amendment interest in gathering and disseminating
information from judicial proceedings. He emphasized that, although competing first amendment interests are sacrificed whenever a judicial proceeding is closed to preserve a fair trial, due
deference to the judge's proximity to the situation compelled him
to acquiesce in the balance struck. In light of this, one might conclude that the press should have focused its arguments more on
the facts of the case itself, showing that the publicity in question
was not inflammatory or widespread enough to raise even the
"reasonable probability" that the defendants could not obtain a
fair trial. Additional emphasis on the unsensational and almost
routine nature of the publicity involved might have persuaded
Justice Powell or other Justices in the majority that the public's
interest in open trials (whether constitutionally based or not) was
being sacrificed without a constitutional need for secrecy. Indeed,
as, a practical matter, Judge DePasquale accorded defendants
Greathouse and Jones an absolute power to compel a private proceeding simply by waiver of their rights to a public trial.236
Although arguments regarding the insufficiency of the showing
of prejudice were raised by the various news media organizations
which filed briefs in Gannett, these arguments were made primarily in light of the Court's holding in Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart237 rather than in the context of a balancing situation. If
one weighs the public's interest in open trials against the right to
a fair trial, the balance clearly is on the side of open trials since
the alleged threat to a fair trial is, at best, speculative and remote.
Moreover, the press again urged the Court to recognize a constitutional right of the press to access, although such proceedings have
long been conducted in secret to protect the witnesses from undue embarrassment, to protect trade secrets, or to preserve the
236. See 99 S. Ct. at 2924-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237. 433 U.S. 1327 (1975) (prior restraint).
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238
confidentiality of undercover agents or state secrets.
The foregoing evaluation, is, of course, merely reflective of the
authors' opinions, as to which some lawyers and commentators
can and will no doubt differ. But certain questions persist: Why
are the press and the courts at odds? Are there latent issues behind this confrontation that neither side is aware of? Is the dispute, characterized by the hyperbolic title The Imperial Judiciary
v. The ParanoidPress, perhaps the result of a gap in communications, which if narrowed could contribute to few confrontations in
the future? We think so.
The press and the courts, as well as the public generally, are all
party to the current confusion over the recent decisions and the
direction of our courts vis-a-vis the press. The origin of this naivete (or confusion) on the part of the press is clouded.
To begin with, litigation which cannot be settled always produces a winner and a loser, and in the last several years there has
been an unparalleled increase in press-related law suits. From
1789 when the first amendment was adopted until 1919 when the
Court decided Schenck v. United States239 and Abrams v. United
States,240 espionage cases involving pamphleteers rather than the
organized press, there were no first amendment press cases decided by the Supreme Court in our constitutional history. The
first Supreme Court case involving the press as related to the first
amendment was Near v. Minnesota,241 which concerned a prior
restraint on publication.
In recent years, however, the "constitutionalization" of libel
law, the advent of broadcast media and their regulation by government, the end of the "commercial speech" exception under the
first amendment, and various enactments of statutory rights of access (Freedom of Information Act, Government and Sunshine
Act, etc.), have produced a dramatic increase in press-related litigation. This, in turn, has expanded the field of liability insurance
to underwrite the cost of libel litigation, but first amendment litigation as well.
Furthermore, the "information explosion" in the Twentieth
Century, making it almost impossible for the ordinary citizen to

238.
239.
240.
241.

See note 229 supra.
249 U.S. 97 (1919).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
283 U.S. 697 (1931).

inform himself of significant events in government, natural sciences, economics, and the like, raises new questions as to what
kinds of information the press may obtain or publish. As stated
by one commentator,
[Previous] methods of obtaining information may well be inadequate today. More accurate and complete information is needed to fulfill the growing requirements of the public for in-depth interpretation of complicated
facts and statistics, as well as more reliable forecasts of future actions and
changing conditions. Journalism is also changing. Serious efforts to cover
minorities and dissident groups as well as to report on increasingly complex government and business activities make necessary 'access to infor242
mation that was previously unimportant because it was non existent.'

Of course, aside from those factors which have given rise to increased press litigation, wherein the press is bound to suffer some
setbacks, the current animosity of the press toward the judiciary
stems more directly from the nature of the modern press and its
self perception. As to the latter point, several commentators have
observed a new arrogance, or a "salvationist ethic" 243 on the part
of the press, due to the recent success of investigative journalists
in uncovering political corruption or other wrong doing. One editor has observed that "[an] occupational disease of journalism is
self-righteousness and an occasional belief that the Constitution
was created only for the First Amendment and that to paraphrase
Charlie (General Motors) Wilson, 'What's good for the press is
2
good for the country'." "
Such beliefs tend to produce the feelings within the press that
it deserves a privileged place in society to which all other interests must be subordinated. Consequently, the press consistently
seeks to consolidate functional privileges which it has enjoyed
over the years and translate them into constitutional "free
speech" rights, which are frequently asserted in inappropriate
cases.
The press, in its capacity as a watchdog of the government and
of the courts, operates in an adversary role. Its reporters are paid
to dig, often where they are not wanted, to uncover information
which others may not want known. Indeed, from the press' point
view, the more information it can obtain will enhance the job
done to serve the public's "right to know." Even on the assumption that all of the news media's myriad activities do serve to enable the press to inform the public, those activities are not
242. Watkins, News Gatheringand the First Amendment, 53 JOURNAuSM Q. 406
(1976) (quoting Comment, Newsgathering: Second Class Right Among First
Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1440 (1975).
243. Chesire, The Imperial Press, NAT'L. REV., Aug. 17, 1979, at 1021.
244. Grunwald, Don't Love the Press, But Understand It, TIME, July 8, 1974, at
74-75.
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necessarily constitutionally protected or of paramount importance. The concept of "the right to know" is devoid of helpful content without addressing the question of what the public should
know. As stated by Professor Telford Taylor:
[T]here certainly is no authorized interpretation of the First Amendment
.... 'that guarantees the people the right to know everything at any time
and every place, whether it be the fact that an enemy code has been broken or the identity of an adolescent victim of a rape. If the phrase ("the
right to know") is simply intended to mean that it is a good thing for the
public to be generally well informed, of course I heartily agree, but in the
solution of the difficult question that we are talking about here (i.e., the
public's right to know as it conflicts with
2 4 5 a defendant's right to a fair trial),
I do not find the phrase at all helpful.

Given such motives and aggressive intent, it is obvious that the
press can be relied upon to resist any possible interference with
or limitations on its right to publish, as well as its right to gather
news and information, even if it comes in the form of a judicial
opinion. Perhaps this accounts for what appears to be the "kneejerk" reactions of the press to so many of the unfavorable pressrelated decisions.
On the other hand, it can be asserted that other characteristics
of the press account for its overreaction to and misapprehension
of judicial decisions. It may be that these supposed distorted perceptions result "naturally", as a matter of course. Consider the
following:
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

The press generally, excluding the specialists who cover the Supreme
Court, does not make a distinction between the "holding" of the Court
and the opinions of the Justices. Frequently the press is confused, and
misinterprets the opinions and fails to separate the specific holding
from elaboration.
The press generally does not appreciate the utility and necessity of the
Court's confining itself to the narrow question presented. It seems
that the press is unable to understand why the Court does not go beyond its holdings to anticipate potential disputes that might later arise
and give specific guidelines to the lower courts on how to follow the
ruling.
The press generally does not understand the function of obiter dictum
in an opinion.
The press is, for the most part, composed of generalists who are impatient with legal niceties, technicalities, and legal jargon. The press
tends to "see the forests" and resists the strictures that come from
"looking at the trees".
The press is impatient with the form of Court opinions, which are written in dry and symbolic language with constant reference to legal
precedents.

245. Taylor, Press and Prejudice: The Impact of News on Justice, 112 Am. PHIL.
Soc'y 124 (1968).

6.

The press fears the impact of Court decisions believing that the rulings are carved in stone and are only rarely modified, distinguished, or
overturned.
7. The press tends to view things as in absolute terms, failing to appreciate that the cases that reach the appellate level of our judiciary systems are hard cases, requiring the courts to balance conflicting
considerations and to play a role of conciliation, creating exceptions or
new concepts to cover unusual circumstances.
8. The press usually tends to be cynical, to dramatize dissent, to concentrate on the confrontations within the judiciary, and to print the "bad
news." This tendency is increased in first amendment cases which
produce a five to four split
in Supreme Court decisions more fre246
quently than other cases.
9. The press often forgets that judicial protection for some of its functions, such as newsgathering, the operations of the editorial process,
the conditional privilege to report on official proceedings or other matters of public interest, is founded in the common law or legislative enactment. The press tends to assimilate instantly every structural or
functional privilege gained, thereafter claiming it an immutable constitutional right. This leads to inappropriate legal confrontations and excessive rhetoric.

Assuming this fairly characterizes the nature and attitude of
the press, there is little wonder that its reaction to anything that
threatens what it perceives to be its absolute freedom may seem
paranoid to the judiciary and to some commentators.
On the other hand, the nature and defensive reactions on the
part of the courts to press criticism is an issue which is similarly
clouded. Courts in our judicial system enjoy a significant level of
independence. Therefore, when judges decide in response to the
publicity attendant to their decisions or by the widespread confusion arising therefrom, to publicly explain the intended meaning
of their opinions (as in Gannett), and to take the press to task for
its news and editorial content on those opinions, the aura of dispassionateness and venerability that generally surrounds the judiciary tends to fade, and one looks for bias or distorted
perceptions which might explain the media's impression that the
courts are antagonistic toward the press. Perhaps, as some members of the press contend, judges, by reason of their training, experience, and position, naturally distrust the press. Consider the
following:
1. Judges are jealous of their constitutional authority and resent press attempts to impose trial procedures which restrict judges' ability to control their own courtrooms. Judges are particularly sensitive to the
claim that news media are better guardians of a defendant's constitutional rights than the court.
2. Judges feel that the press, at least in cases where it is a litigant, is biased and tends to manipulate its reporting on the courts to influence
public opinion in its favor. For example, the press fully reports on almost all decided cases concerning press rights, many of which are rel246. See generally, Powell, Myths and Misconceptions About the Supreme
Court, 61 AM. BAR Ass. J. 1347 (1975).
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atively unimportant, but ignores many non-media cases which are of
considerably more significance.
3. Judges complain that the press, and particularly commercial television, rarely can present effectively the complex matters that surround
the court system. For example, judicial opinions, which require careful and considered analysis by legal scholars, are frequently subjected
to instant analysis and reaction by the press. This tends to distort
court news. Consequently, the public rarely gets the opportunity to
read or hear sober discussions of both sides of media-related decisions. Naturally, this frustrates judges who, by tradition and pursuant
to the Code of Judicial Conduct,2 4 7 are reluctant to comment publicly
on the meaning or basis of a judicial decision or to respond to personal
attacks.
4. Judges sometimes resent the press' absolutist perspective of the first
amendment; the frequent knee-jerk, overwrought reactions of the
press to any balancing of rights which result in restrictions on its activities reflects an arrogance
and claim for preferential status that
248
judges naturally resist.
5. Judges recognize that, at least at the trial level, media defendants (in
libel and privacy suits, for instance), or particularly members of the
media who on short notice seek to intervene for purposes of contesting
gag orders, motions for closure, etc., are represented by corporate
counsel who may not specialize in the first amendment field. As a result, judges who must make interlocutory rulings on motions for closure, etc., without the benefit of adequate time for independent
research, and often are not presented with a concise and well framed
exposition of the applicable'facts and law. This, in turn, may result in
rulings which, even if ultimately correct under the circumstances, lend
247. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, No. 3(A) (b).
248. Although narrowly restricted prior restraint, on publication are permissible only when the speech in question "will surely result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people", New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring), the courts have often upheld other forms of governmental regulation of speech by balancing competing interests. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978), Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (commercial speech);
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding
restrictions on union activities by prisoners); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (picketing and demonstration); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(symbolic speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding campaign
finance disclosure requirement); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (upholding restriction on press interviews with inmates); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding the conviction
of a soldier under the Code of Military Justice for urging blacklisted men not to go
to Vietnam); United States Civil Service Comm. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (regulation of expression by the broadcast media); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959)
(upholding a requirement that witnesses respond to legislative inquiries); Adler v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding requirements of loyalty oaths);
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 431 U.S. 716 (1951); and Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).

themselves to appeal based on an inadequate presentation of the applicable law or the lack of a sufficient underlying factual record.
6. Judges may lose respect or sympathy for the working press because
reporters, not trained or experienced in the judicial process, often mis249
interpret or exaggerate what actually happens or is important.
7. Judges also complain that the press is not truly interested in court
problems and fails to help them inform the public about much-needed
improvements and reforms.

Given the foregoing circumstances surrounding judges' perceptions and dealings with the press, it is not surprising that a degree
of judicial antagonism toward the press has resulted, which only
increases press mistrust and paranoia.
The apparent hostility of the press toward the courts, published
in response to recent judicial decisions, creates perceptions which
may undermine both the effectiveness of our judicial institutions
and the public confidence which they require. Judges are concerned that the basis and impact of rulings are distorted in the
press, which not only confuses the public as to the state of the
law but encourages the belief that the courts, and the Supreme
Court in particular, do not uphold the first amendment. It is safe
to say that most jurists not only disagree with this contention, but
feel it diverts attention from, or even generates public opposition
to, the fiscal and other commitments needed to upgrade our judicial system.
The jeremiads of the press in response to recent decisions may
generate as much public dissatisfaction with the press as with the
judiciary. While the kind of rhetoric discussed herein may be an
249. Justice Brennan, in his Rutgers speech, pointed out that two newspapers
actually erroneously characterized the opinion in the Herbert case as holding that
truth would not longer be an absolute defense in libel suits. New Orleans Times
Picayune, Apr. 20, 1979, at 18; Birmingham News, April 19, 1979, at 12.
One example of erroneous or misleading editorializing on decisions of the
Supreme Court is found in High Court vs. The Press: The Supreme Court, A Decade of Constitutional Revision, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 18, 1979, at 76.
There, Sidney Zion, both a former legal reporter for the Times and former Assistant U.S. Attorney, described the Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), as holding that (a) private citizens have "no constitutional right to seek
damages for any harm done to his reputation by police," and (b) "government officials may, in bad faith, defame the innocent." In fact, the Court held in a five to
three decision that the plaintiff-who was defamed in a flyer circulated by police
for the purpose of alerting local merchants to possible shoplifters operating during
the Christmas season-had simply not stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
1983. That statute creates a federal cause of action for any person whose constitutional "rights, privileges, or immunities" are deprived by another, acting under
color of state law. Contrary to Mr. Zion's statements, the courts by no means
ruled, or even implied, that the plaintiff had no effective remedies against the police or that government officials may defame innocent persons with impunity. As
stated in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, "[plaintiff's] complaint would appear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually
every State." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976).
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honest reaction to decisions which the press has "lost", also underscores the enormous autonomy, or, if you will, freedom from
accountability of the press. Generalized protests that the news
media deserves special protection from searches and seizures,
that editors sued for the intentional tort of libel are immune from
inquiry as to their intent, and that the first amendment accords
access to any information or events which the press deems newsworthy, clearly irritate many people. Hostile questions such as
"Who elected the press anyway?," and "Who is to watch the
watchdog?," are often hurled at editors. The loss of public confidence in the press is something we must all seek to avoid.
A good deal mopre is at stake here than simply the sensibilities of the
press. As the public loses confidence in the press, so will it cease to care
greatly when the rights of the press-the legitimate rights-are transgressed. An arrogant, prideful press may have rights, but it will have few
friends to speak of, and a friendless
press is a press more enfeebled than
250
is healthy for the Republic.

Moreover, the concept that "the squeaky wheel gets the
'
grease," or "vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subvernient,"251
may not hold true if the injury claimed and protection sought by
the press far exceeds the injury suffered. The press therefore
must not only be careful not to strain its credibility with its readership, the economic lifeblood of the press, but with legislators
and judges as well, who uphold or enact legal protection for the
press. The press must seek to educate legislators, judges, and the
public as to the real world of journalism, the role that the press
must play in our society if it is to remain open, and society's need
52
for legal protection of its functions. 2
Some tension between the press and the courts is healthy as
250. Chesire, The Imperial Press, NAT'L. REV. Aug. 17, 1979, at 1021.
251. The laws assist the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
252. The educational process has already begun. Two first amendment Congresses, sponsored by 12 national journalism organizations, were held to heighten
public awareness of the free press guarantee, the promoters hoped to exert a
favorable influence on the educators, attorneys, and business people who attended. The Congresses were sponsored by the American Newspaper Publishers
Association, Associated Press Managing Editors Association, American Society of
Newspaper Editors, National Association of Broadcasters, National Broadcast Editorial Association, National Conference of Editorial Writers, National Newspaper
Association, Radio-Television News Directors Association, Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, Society of Professional Journalists/Sigma Delta Chi, the
Associated Press and United Press International. EDITOR & PUBLISHER pleaded
with journalists to treat these Congresses specially (journalists do not give much
space or time to journalistic meetings), so that the impact on the public would be
more than minimal. Editorial, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 5, 1980, at 8.

well as necessary. A constructive dialogue between the press and
judiciary is, however, needed. It can lead to an understanding
that judges and journalists are persons of good faith acting in
service to the same ideals of "enlightened opinion and right conduct" 253 on the part of our citizenry. Such an understanding, however, requires a realization on the part of the press that its
freedom from governmental abridgement under the first amendment does not exist for the benefit of the press alone, but for the
benefit of all. Most serious journalists do not question the need to
balance the rights of the free press against other rights in society,
including the rights of defendants. Such journalists contest only
the degree of balance, and that is the essence of today's controversy. Thus, it is not suggested that the press abandon its vigilance to protect press freedoms; the fight, however, perhaps needs
to be waged more intelligently, and on selected issues, and without the bitterness and rancor which has characterized the controversy over Zurcher, Herbert, and Gannett. The strident and
haughty laments, voiced by the news media in response to these
decisions perceived to threaten the press, only produces a backlash of resentment and undercuts press response that might later
be warranted.
The sensitivity of the Supreme Court to the peculiar selfrighteousness of current press criticism is evident. 254 Both Justice
Brennan and Justice Stevens have lectured the press on its misconception of constitutional press freedoms. Justice Brennan,
long a staunch friend of the cause of press freedom, has spoken of
the news media's rush to "codgel" the Court after the Herbert decision, and how such hostile reaction ultimately. may impair the
credibility of the press:
If the press wishes to play a part in this (legal) process, it must carefully
distinguish the basis of which its constitutional claim is based, and it must
tailor its arguments and its rhetoric accordingly. This may involve a certain loss of innocence, a certain recognition that the press, like other institutions, must accommodate a variety of important social interests. But
the sad complexity of our society makes this
inevitable, and there is no
255
alternative but shrill and impotent isolation.

Perhaps now is the time for judges and journalists to recognize
that they share certain common interests, if not a common fate.
As New York's Iriving R. Kaufman, Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit, has written:
253. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
254. See note 230 supra.
255. See note 14 supra.
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Different as the press and the federal judiciary are, they share one distinctive characteristic: both sustain democracy, not because they are responsible to any branch of Government, but precisely because, except in the
most extreme cases they are not accountable at all. Thus, they are able to
256
check the irresponsibility of those in power ....

256. See note 3 supra. Without a free press, there can be no society. Freedom
of the press, however, is not an end in itself but the means toward the end of a
free society . . . an independent judiciary puts the freedom of the press in its
proper perspective. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-355.

